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The transnationalization of truth:
A meditation on Sri Lanka and
Honduras
Craig Scott1

Abstract: The present article is an elaboration of the text prepared for a lecture,
delivered in London, England, on Tuesday, October 19, 2010, as part of the Centre
for Transnational Legal Studies’ annual Transnational Justice Lecture series. The paper
begins, in Section II, with general comments on a notion of “interactive diversity of
knowledge” and how that connects up to a view about the nature of truth. Sections III
and IV then present salient aspects of events in both Honduras and Sri Lanka over the
last two years, with the coup d’ état of 28 June 2009, in Honduras and the bloody end
to the civil war in Sri Lanka in spring 2009 as fulcrums of the narrative. In each case,
emphasis is also placed on the establishment of truth-related commissions or panels
in relation to each country. The paper ends with a discussion of three interconnected
quandaries—the inside/outside quandary; the consistency and fairness quandary; and
the timing quandary. The timing (or staging) quandary offers some provisional thinking
on the sequencing of processes related to truth, justice and reconciliation, offering some
reasons not to fuse truth-seeking processes with either criminal justice or reconciliation
processes—with special reference to the Sri Lanka context.
The present paper consists of an elaboration of the text prepared for the first lecture of the 2010-2011 year
in the CTLS / Centre for Transnational Legal Studies’ annual Transnational Justice Lecture series. It was
delivered in London, England, on Tuesday, October 19, 2010. The lecture itself consisted mostly of the first
four sections of this text, with the discussion session addressing some aspects of the quandaries that make up
the fifth section. A prior version appeared as Craig Scott, “The Transnationalization of Truth: A Meditation
on Sri Lanka and Honduras (A Transnational Justice Lecture)”, Osgoode CLPE Research Paper 07/2011
Vol. 07 No. 03 (2011), available for download http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759072.. The present Ethics in
Action version contains both a number of important copy-edits and several substantive additions (to section
III on Honduras) subsequent to the Osgoode CLPE Research Paper. As with the previous version, the present
version retains its dual format as both a lecture (with certain elements related to oral delivery) and a written
article.
1

Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto; Director (on leave, 2010-2011),
Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security. This paper was prepared while
an Ikerbasque Fellow, 2010-2011, with Basque Government’s Foundation for Science and while based at
Deusto University, Bilbao. The author is currently serving as one of ten commissioners on the Honduran
Comisión de Verdad (Truth Commission) established in June 2010 by a coalition of six human rights
non-governmental organizations, known collectively as the Plataforma de Derechos Humanos. He is also
a member of the Advisory Council of the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I have a single, somewhat long, paper in hand, from which I am choosing elements
for this lecture according to my understanding of the nature of the audience and also
the needs of the moment. What do I mean by this enigmatic “needs of the moment”?
Basically, I am thinking of the need for more people—ideally, more thoughtful people—
to know about what I believe to be important (indeed, says the closet Hegelian in me,
world-historical) events and processes that have occurred since early 2009 in two country
contexts of which I have a special—not to say a full—knowledge. Those countries are Sri
Lanka and Honduras. In this lecture, I seek to narrate developments in Sri Lanka and
Honduras in a way that I hope keeps your attention and provokes you to sub-consciously
muse about what “transnationalization of truth” dimensions seem to be raised by these
events and processes.
I will proceed as follows. First, in Section II, I make some very general comments on
a notion of “interactive diversity of knowledge” and how that connects up to a view
about the nature of truth. Second, in Sections III and IV, I describe salient—while still
selective—aspects of events in both Honduras and Sri Lanka, starting with the former.
Third, I finally proceed in Section V to a condensed discussion of three interconnected
quandaries; in future work I will hopefully use this paper as a springboard in order to
knit together these quandaries more tightly and within a more unified flow of argument
than will be possible here in this lecture. At present, I have opted to jump from hilltop to
hilltop, largely ignoring the connecting valleys in between.
In order to provide you with some orientation for thinking about the implication of the
upcoming narratives of developments in Honduras and Sri Lanka, I set out here the three
quandaries that will be treated in some detail in Section V:
• In establishing truth in a national context, what account must be taken of internal/
external dynamics related to both facts and perceptions concerning outside
involvement, including facts and perceptions associated with state-sovereigntist
beliefs? Let us call this the inside/outside quandary.
• Is the transnationalization of truth-seeking and truth-articulation in any way disabled
by systemic problems (or assertions of systemic problems) of double standards,
selectivity of attention, or even hypocrisy? Let us call this the consistency and fairness
quandary.
• Partly in light of the inside/outside quandary and the fairness quandary, how should
processes related to truth be timed or staged in relation to processes related to justice
and reconciliation? Let us call this the timing quandary.
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I am about to turn to the two contexts, starting with Honduras. But let me add a major
caveat, lest you are expecting a rigorous comparative analysis. Such is not my purpose,
at least not here, now. The Sri Lanka and Honduras reference points for this lecture owe
much to serendipity, so please do not assume that my decision to treat both contexts in
this lecture has been selected through a process of pure scholarly detachment. Rather,
my interest in and knowledge of both contexts has been highly path dependent, in both
cases resulting from being asked to serve either on a body (the civil-society Comisión de
Verdad in Honduras) or within an organization (the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and
Justice) that is each very transnational in nature and that each have the establishment of
truth and the related objectives of justice and societal peace as their raison d’être. That
said, the choice to follow serendipity’s path is not purely arbitrary. Just as one of the most
discovery-generating forms of basic research is—or, before our digitized age, used to
be—browsing a library’s stacks and spying titles by chance, I have discovered by chance
that these two contexts can be reflected upon in tandem in a way that will turn out to be
fruitful. Even so—and here I return to my caveat—it remains the case that the approach
taken is more one of juxtaposed examples than one of integrated comparison.2

II. TRUTH AND INTERACTIVE DIVERSITY OF KNOWLEDGE
My main purpose in this brief section is to explain, very summarily, what I mean by
seeking to achieve “interactive diversity of knowledge” in any process in which ‘the truth
of the matter’ is being sought—whether the correct interpretation of a treaty provision, or
whether something took place as alleged, or whether what took place constitutes a crime,
and so on. This notion was initially presented in a work called “Bodies of Knowledge”,
then in a piece called “Towards the Institutional Integration of the Core Human Rights
Treaty Bodies”, and is also discussed in a working paper called “Diverse Persuasion(s).”3
In the first two instances, the context was UN-level discussion about whether to
consolidate the core UN human rights treaty bodies into one or two bodies, while the
third piece looks more abstractly at the practice of treaty interpretation as it relates to
whether there should be some form of international human rights court.

2

Also, note that this piece, with its source in a lecture, is very lightly footnoted. Where footnoted, it is as
much as an aide-memoire to myself as for any other principled reason.

3

“Bodies of Knowledge: A Diversity Promotion Role for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights”
in Philip Alston and James Crawford, eds., The Future of UN Human Rights Monitoring (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000) 403-437; “Towards the Institutional Integration of the Core Human
Rights Treaties” in Valerie Oosterveld and Isfahan Merali, eds., Reaching Beyond Words: Giving Meaning
to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), chapter
1 (pp 7-38, fn: 213-225); "Diverse Persuasion(s): From Rhetoric to Representation (and Back Again to
Rhetoric) in International Human Rights Interpretation" (January 24, 2008). CLPE Research Paper No.
4/2008, Vol. 4, No. 1,available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087339.
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My argument has been that harnessing diversity of at least three forms of knowledge
(expertise, experience, and intellectual or disciplinary perspective) must be central to any
consolidation reforms let alone the creation of a new court. I have been advocating the
position that a variety of diversity-enhancing initiatives must be undertaken immediately
with respect to the current UN human rights treaty body order, in part because practical
experimentation with the promotion of not simply diversity of knowledge, but interactive
diversity of knowledge, should provide valuable lessons at the institutional design stages
of any eventual consolidation project.
But the central thrust of the argument was—and is here—that such an approach is
independently desirable quite apart from whether treaty-body consolidation is in the
cards or indeed quite apart from the treaty-body context at all. Let me say something
briefly about two of the central premises bearing on this desirability. The first is that
superior collective judgment is exercised when multiple perspectives are encouraged to
interact with each other in coming to grips with any given normative issue or decision.
The second premise is that, in order for diverse perspectives and actors to interact, there
must first be a commitment to ensuring diversity of knowledge within the composition of
the membership of collective decision-making bodies. More generally, as an outgrowth of
these two premises, diversity multiplies perspectives, while the need for decision-making
necessitates that these perspectives engage each other. Diversity helps oust monological
reasoning in favour of dialogical reasoning, making it less likely that reasoning will take
place within the four corners of a single person’s limited knowledge and more likely that
it will take place in the context of the requirement to test one’s intuitions, assumptions,
and provisional conclusions against those of others.
I turn now to a few comments on the small matter of truth. Part of the rationale for any
institutional strategy of opening up normative vistas by embracing an interactive diversity
of knowledge lies in self-conscious awareness of our (we humans’) tendency to link ‘truth’
and ‘self-evidence’ in untenable ways. All the same, even as we may be aware of this
tendency, it is probably safe to say that most of us who actively take part in international
or transnational human rights discourse are nevertheless striving to articulate something
morally fundamental or essential in the course of our involvement. Indeed, many of us
including myself would feel lost without such an orientation to the enterprise in which
we are engaged.
However—and here I warn you that I am entering the rocky terrain of irony that I have
been stumbling around in for a good couple decades now—that does not mean that we
must necessarily believe that concepts in texts like “freedom of expression” or even “torture”
correspond to some ‘objective’ reality waiting to be revealed as part of, or discovered in,
the moral firmament. Even if some—or indeed many—of us do firmly believe that some
correspondence (or, perhaps more subtly, idea of correspondence) between language and
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the revelation of something called moral reality is a defensible or even necessary way of
thinking, such belief is still compatible with an awareness that what we may speak of in
terms of objectivity or universal validity or truth is never knowable other than in terms
of what we (whoever ‘we’ are) understand to be objective or universally valid or true at a
given point in time. By the reference to ‘we’ and not ‘I’, I wish to emphasize that access
to truth is mediated by language, and language is a phenomenon constructed on the
shifting ground of intersubjective understanding. But—and here enters some element of
existential worry with which, I believe, we must live4 —we can never ‘know’ in any final
way whether an understanding we have reached intersubjectively is anything more than
provisional, or valid in any sense beyond the intersubjective. In this respect, whatever
quest(s) for truth may be implicit (or indeed, perhaps necessarily implicit) in our various
involvements in ‘the’ human rights project, meaning remains quintessentially human—
both socially constructed and fallible in its relationship to that (ultimate) truth we (perhaps
ironically) seek.
One obvious implication of all this is that each of us has good reason to be humble
about our knowledge. Indeed, we have good reason to be positively suspicious of our
own understandings to the extent that they have been produced unreflectively or outside
conditions of dialogical diversity. Thus, ideas such as “epistemological humility” and
“hermeneutics of suspicion” have had considerable currency in writing on interpretation
for some decades. These ideas express the warning that we must be on our guard against
the effects our specific location might have on our powers of criticism and judgment
and on the reception we give to the arguments of others—especially when our specific
location is, we understand, a privileged location on one or more relevant dimensions.
I know these will have been both quite abstract and somewhat Escheresque claims, while
at the same time I hope that some of the points will have made sense on their own—that
is, without a context to which to relate them. But first and foremost, I have taken the
time—and indeed the liberty—to make these preliminary theoretical points so that you
might have a better sense of where I am coming from when I discuss the two contexts—
Honduras and Sri Lanka—in which I am playing some truth-seeking role. As well, I hope
the relevance of some of the notions will become even clearer when I go on to discuss the
three quandaries.

4

In the working paper called “Diverse Persuasion(s)”, ibid, I discuss a certain existentialist approach to
legal judgment in the name of human rights, in terms of what I call the “rhetorical responsibility” of the
person judging.
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III. HONDURAS
A. EVENTS IN HONDURAS FROM 2005 TO 28 JUNE 2009 5
Honduras is a country of approximately eight million in the middle of the isthmus of
Central America. Within the Americas (there are 33 states in the OAS), Honduras is in
the bottom fifth or sixth on most human development indicators. On the UNDP’s 2009
Human Poverty Index, Honduras does better than only four other countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean (El Salvador, Belize, Guatemala, and Haiti). It has had a long
history of military coups and lengthy dictatorships, but, since 1981, had an uninterrupted
run of elected governments until 2009. It is generally recognized that much of the 1970s
and, notwithstanding an elected government starting in 1981, most of the 1980s were
periods of significant human rights peril from both state security forces and shadowy,
state-connected paramilitaries. Honduras was a frontline state in the US proxy war that
sought to overthrow the post-Revolutionary Sandinista government in Nicaragua in
which the US used both the rebels known as the Contras and direct CIA covert action.
This, most experts agree, exacerbated the militarization of Honduran society.
Honduras' current constitution was created afresh by a constituent assembly in 1981. In
terms of how the democracy actually functions, essentially two parties—the Liberal Party
and the National Party—vie for the Presidency and for control of Congress. In November
2005 (taking office in January 2006), the Liberal Party candidate, Manuel Zelaya, was
elected President. The Constitution prohibits a President from serving for consecutive
terms, so his successor was scheduled to be elected in November 2009, only four months
after the 28 June 2009 coup d’ état that forced Zelaya from office early. The presidential
candidates for his own Liberal Party and for the National Party had already been chosen
well before the coup.
To the extent it is accurate to say that the Liberal-National contestation for political
power has been very much an elite affair, Zelaya very much fit the norm as he came from
a wealthy family. Unexpectedly—including for his own Liberal Party—he began to adopt
policies that saw him increasingly characterized as both a populist and a leftist (which,
in Honduras’ very conservative elite political culture does leave a rather wide spectrum).
Key examples were pushing through a 60 percent minimum wage hike and joining the
5

It bears emphasizing that the following summary is my responsibility alone, and does not necessarily
reflect the assessments of facts or the views of my co-Commissioners on the Comisión de Verdad.
Further, even from my own point of view, these are provisional views, which I am open to revising if
errors are pointed out; in that respect, I wholeheartedly welcome communications that point out any
inaccuracies. Finally, this overview is, by and large, schematic and general. As such, both detail and
nuance—of the sort that will be found in the final report of the Comisión—will, for the most part,
necessarily be lacking.
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Venezuela-led interstate agreement known as PetroCaribe that allowed Caribbean Basin
countries access to oil at market prices on cost-saving preferential terms on condition
that a state-owned company did the importing of the oil and no private companies act as
intermediaries.
Attracting the most attention in the final period of Zelaya’s Presidency was his effort
to hold a national poll on 28 June 2009. That poll was to ask the people whether they
would like to see an extra ballot added during the next set of Presidential (and other)
elections—i.e. those to be held in November 2009. On this added ballot would appear
a question asking voters whether they wish to see convened a constituent assembly
for purposes of replacing or revising the existing constitution. (Recall that there was a
constituent assembly that led to the 1982 Constitution, such that any process that did
lead to a constituent assembly following the November 2009 elections would take place
almost 30 years after the last assembly.) To repeat for clarity’s sake, if the planned June 28
poll were to produce a majority opinion in favour of including a ballot question about a
constituent assembly during the November 2009 elections and if Zelaya then used that
result as a basis for actually adding a ballot to the November 2009 elections voting form,
it would be that latter ballot that would ask some sort of question as to whether people
(or, put differently, ‘the people’) wanted to have a new constituent assembly. The merged
question of a June 28 vote about whether to have another November vote became known
as the “fourth ballot” (cuarta urna) issue, there being three ballots (including the election
of the President and members of Congress) already part of the November 2009 vote.
The controversy around the fourth-ballot issue revolved around two overlapping
issues—one being the substantive merits of having such a ballot in November from the
perspective of (in)adequacy of the existing constitution, and the other being whether it
was lawful for Zelaya to pursue a constituent assembly in the manner in which he was
proceeding. This latter issue had a sub-issue of whether it was lawful to even seek out the
opinion of the people (in June) about having such a fourth ballot (in November). At a
certain point, it appears that a large majority of members of Congress—including many,
possibly most, within Zelaya’s own party—were against it. Some arguments centered
on an alleged intention of Zelaya to use a constituent assembly as a means to change
the constitution in order to permit him to run for a second term—which it not only
prohibited in the current 1982 Constitution but is also designated by the Constitution
as one of the unamendable (and thus perpetual) articles in the Constitution—and/or
the fact that any constituent assembly could end up wanting to totally replace the whole
constitution including any or all of the other unamendable provisions. Other arguments
were about concern as to whether Zelaya would adhere to the current constitutional
provisions on constitutional amendment (which centre on Congress) as the vehicle
for convening a constituent assembly and as limits on what that constituent assembly
could decide on its own (without being confirmed by Congress in accordance with the
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existing constitutional amendment provisions). Further from the surface, but perhaps
most significant, were almost certainly widespread fears about what principles Zelaya
might try to use as the basis for the composition of a constituent assembly; such fears
overlap with the question of the role of Congress which in turn overlaps with the desire
of current political elites for political parties to be the basis on which representatives
for a constituent assembly would be selected—and in turn these concerns overlap with
rejection of other bases for the membership of a constituent assembly, such as principles
related to social-sector representation (campesinos, worker representatives, indigenous
communities, and so on) or demographic representativity (e.g. in relation to women).
Note as well that the accusation that Zelaya was being accused by some of wanting a
constituent assembly so that he personally could run for a second consecutive term
seemed to dovetail with a fierce reaction from some quarters to the perception that
Zelaya had gotten too close to Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez (who had himself
managed to amend the Venezuelan constitution so as to allow himself to run again
for President). Note that the relationship with Venezuela, and thus Chavez, was not
simply through PetroCaribe but also through Zelaya leading Honduras into a regional
association originally formed by Venezuela and Cuba, an organization known as ALBA
or the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America. Statements made by Chavez
while in Honduras, which were highly dismissive of any opposition to ALBA, may have
been the straw that broke the camel’s back for some critics of Zelaya. (Finally, note that
the argument Zelaya was somehow seeking to extend his presidency seemed to take on
a dimension of hyperventilation after the June 28 coup when some asserted that Zelaya
planned—somehow—to dissolve Congress the day after the June 28 opinion poll and—
again, somehow—immediately convene a constituent assembly without conducting an
actual ballot (i.e. the ‘fourth ballot’) on whether to have a constituent assembly let alone
wait until November to do so.)
To better understand the issues at stake and the nature of what then transpired with the
coup on the same day as the intended poll, it is important to distinguish between two
stages of Zelaya’s efforts to set the stage for a possible constituent assembly. Initially,
Zelaya sought to hold a consultation (consulta popular) for June 28, which notion is
recognized in the form of either a referendum or a plebiscite in the Constitution and
circumscribed in terms of process and mechanisms by both the Constitution and laws
enacted pursuant to the provision on the consulta popular (article 5 of the Constitution).
Zelaya’s government started the ball rolling on 23 March 2009, with Executive Decree
PCM-05-2009, stating the plan to hold a consulta popular. But then, on May 8, a
constitutional official known as the Ministerio Público (whose functions include defence
of the constitutional order), applied to a judge (within the jurisdiction known as the
Juzgado de Letras de la Jurisdiccion de lo Contencioso Administrativo) to have Executive
Decree PCM-05-2009 declared illegal and to have it set aside (see discussion of the
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reasoning below). On May 26, this judge issued an interlocutory (interim) judgment
(sentencia interlocutoria) ordering Zelaya’s government to suspend the consulta prepration
process. Here, note that Executive Decree PCM-05-2009 had not been published in
the national gazette either at the time the legal challenge was launched or at the time of
the judge’s May 27 judgment. In Honduras, it is a task of the government to publish
decrees in order for them to have the force of law. Before that, a decree is an executive bill
(the Spanish word for bill, proyecto (project), nicely conveys the not-yet-law status of an
unpublished decree. As decrees do not enter into force in Honduras until published, the
Ministerio Público challenged (or purported to challenge) and the judge suspended (or
purported to suspend) an executive act that was not yet law.
The second stage began on May 26, the day before the May 27 judicial ruling with
respect to PCM-05-2009, mentioned in the last paragraph. On May 29, the government
announced to the public through the media that, on May 26, that Executive Decree
PCM-19-2009 had been adopted by Cabinet. In this new decree, the previously adopted
(but never published) decree PCM-05-2009 on the consulta popular is replaced by the
new PCM-19-2009 that sets out a new kind of sounding of national option in the form
of a national opinion poll (encuesta nacional de opinion), with the question to be polled
being almost but not quite same as the question that had been set out in PCM-05-2009.
The poll would occur on June 28 and all other executive organs were required to actively
carry out this poll. In tandem with the new Executive Decree PCM-19-2009, it was
announced that Cabinet had approved an Executive Agreement 027-2009 that detailed
the responsibilities of various actors within the executive. Notably, the National Institute
of Statistics (INE / Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas) would run the poll and the armed
forces were also to cooperate in carrying it out. Note that this PCM-19-2009 would be
published, and this did enter into force as law, but the government did not publish it in
the gazette until 25 June 2009 (that is, three days before the planned polling date, which
became the coup date). In response to this May 29 announcement, the same court (at the
insistence, again, of the Ministerio Público, it seems) issued a ‘clarification’ to its May 27
interlocutory judgment stating that his suspension extended to any other act, however
named, attempting to do the same thing as what he had prevented. No new application
was brought by the Ministerio Público and no new application was required by the judge,
each assuming, it would seem, that the consulta popular contemplated in PCM-05-2009
was fungible with the national opinion poll planned by the subsequent PCM-19-2009.
Absent from this annex to his previous judgment is any legal analysis of why a nonbinding opinion poll was (in the judge’s view) illegal for the same reasons as a consulta
popular. As with PCM-05-2009, neither the Ministerio Público nor the judge seemed at
all concerned that they were again jointly impugning a decree that did not yet have the
force of law (PCM-19-2009).
Central to the explicit legal reasoning on the consulta and the implicit legal reasoning on
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the encuesta appears to have been the view that the 1982 Constitution’s prohibition on
consecutive Presidential terms was, by the text of that Constitution, unamendable. From
this starting point, it was reasoned that the entire process—starting with the planned
June 28 consultation—could lead to an eventual constituent assembly deciding to allow
for two or more consecutive terms. It was finally reasoned that the very start of this chain
of possibility was unconstitutional.
Two seemingly salient points did not seem to dissipate the political—and then judicial—
opposition to the planned June 28 consultation about having a November fourth ballot.
The first point is that the poll planned for June 28 was non-binding—it was advisory
only. The second point was that the Presidential elections to take place in November
2009 was the constitutionally required election that would elect a new President in
accordance with the existing constitution. Zelaya could not be on the ballot, and his own
Liberal Party had already chosen their candidate to run in the election. Accordingly, two
new candidates, one from the National Party and one from the Liberal Party, would be
presenting themselves.
Thus, what people were to vote about in a non-binding poll on June 28 was whether to
have a question in a November ballot about whether to have a constituent assembly, and
even if such a November ballot resulted in a ‘yes’, a new President (other than Zelaya)
would already have been elected that very same day. This result is quite apart from the
fact that a constituent assembly would still have to be held, at which point it is entirely
possible no one would be seriously interested in the issue of increased presidential terms
and that many might be more interested in a wholesale updating of the constitutional
order (which does indeed seem to be what had generated significant enthusiasm amongst
many Hondurans both for the June 28 poll and for any subsequent November “fourth
ballot” on whether to have a constituent assembly). Political opponents have never quite
managed to explain how Zelaya was going to manage to place himself on the ballot for
the presidential election that was occurring the very same day as the “fourth ballot” that
would answer the question of whether to convene a constituent assembly (some time after
the date of the vote, obviously) that might at that point seek to change the constitutional
clause prohibiting a second term. Put simply, unless an error in my reasoning is pointed
out by more expert observers, it was an impossibility for Zelaya to end up with a second
consecutive term through a process initiated by the planned June 28 referendum.
Thus, the political argument seems untenable—unless it shifted ground, as it eventually
did after the coup. At that time, the argument moved away from being about what Zelaya
was allegedly seeking to orchestrate through the fourth ballot in November, to become
an accusation that Zelaya somehow intended to bring about a change to the constitution
that would allow him to stand again and would do this between the June 28 vote and
the November elections. The US Embassy in its Wikileaked analysis of 27 July 2009,
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dismisses as “supposition” two post-coup justifications that the Embassy was hearing (two
of some seven arguments the Embassy notes being bandied about after the coup), namely
“Zelaya intended to extend his term in office (supposition)” and “Had he been allowed to
proceed with his June 28 constitutional reform opinion poll, Zelaya would have dissolved
Congress the following day and convened a constituent assembly (supposition).”6 It is
well worth noting that this line of argument does not seem to have faded as the currently
governing President Lobo, on 29 January 2011, is reported to have said on Honduras’
Radio Globo not only that Zelaya told him that he wanted to stay on for another term
but that Zelaya attempted to get Lobo involved in this effort (in ways not entirely clear
from the report).7
But it does not appear that the lower court seized with the issue of the legality and/or
constitutionality of the June 28 vote (and the appeal court that at one point affirmed
that judge’s ruling) needed to be concerned with any alleged aspirations of Zelaya
himself to serve a second consecutive term. As indicated above, its focus, it seems, was
on the mere possibility that some constituent assembly would draft a constitution to
allow some future President to run twice in a row (or a constitution that would amend
or replace some other sections of the 1982 Constitution that were also considered as
petrified and non-amendable). Thus it was that the court ordered Zelaya not to hold the
consultation—because the consultation could result in a referendum that could result in
a constituent assembly that could result in a purportedly new constitution that might not
contain the unamendable clauses of the present constitution.
A series of impasses followed the Judge’s May 29 extension of his judgment against a
consulta to include the poll. On two separate occasions (June 6 and June 18), the judge
sent a communication to Zelaya ordering the government to comply with his May 27
injunction as clarified by him on May 29. Whatever the balance between Zelaya resisting
his opponents versus, as they would characterize it, defying the court, Zelaya went ahead
with the plans to hold the poll, including launching in the lead-up to June 28 a vibrant
national TV and radio campaign urging people to participate in politics by voting in the
consultation. These plans proceeded notwithstanding that Executive Decree PCM-192009 did not enter into force until 25 June 2009, when published in the gazette a mere
three days before the planned polling day.
6

Cable from Ambassador Hugo Llorens to Department of State Legal Advisor Harold Koh,
“TFHO1: OPEN AND SHUT: THE CASE OF THE HONDURAN COUP”, Reference ID
09TEGUCIGALPA645, July 24, 2009 (classification” Confidential), available at http://www.wikileaks.
ch/cable/2009/07/09TEGUCIGALPA645.html [Llorens-Koh cable].

7

Associated Press, “Honduras' Lobo: Zelaya Wanted To Stay In Office -- Honduras' Lobo Says Ousted
President Zelaya Told Him Point-blank He Wanted To Stay In Power”, WashingtonPost.com (January 29,
2011), available for download at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/29/
AR2011012903633.html (last accessed February 8, 2011).
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Zelaya had his own resistance to contend with. Close to June 28, Zelaya fired the Chief
of Defence Staff, General Vasquez Velasquez, who had refused to order the army to
assist with the carrying out of the June 28 national poll. Proceedings were brought by
the General, and the Defence Chief was reinstated on June 25 by the Supreme Court
based on an interpretation of the Constitution that (in the view of the Court) fettered
the power of the President to fire the head of the military. As summarized in the US
Embassy legal-analysis memo, “The Supreme Court's Constitutional Hall ruled June 25
that Zelaya was in violation of the Constitution for dismissing Defense Chief Vasquez
Velasquez; the Constitution (article 280) states that the President may freely name or
remove the chief of the armed forces; but the court ruled that since Zelaya fired him for
refusing to carry out a poll the court had ruled illegal, the firing was illegal.”
On the day that people were to take part in the poll—June 28—Zelaya was forcibly
ousted from office when soldiers came to his Presidential residence and purported to
arrest him. In the words of the US Ambassador in a Wikileaked cable (already mentioned
above and discussed further below), “the soldiers forced their way in by shooting out the
locks and essentially kidnapped the President.”8 Rather than taking Zelaya into custody
in Honduras, they placed him on a plane, still in his pajamas, and deposited him in Costa
Rica.
No warrant was presented to Zelaya at the time of the ouster. After the ouster, Supreme
Court documents were released that were dated before that ouster. These court documents
(with date stamps and signatures) showed that some 18 criminal charges including
treason had been brought against Zelaya in the Supreme Court by the Fiscal General
(Chief National Prosecutor) on June 25, the same day as PCM-19-2009 was published
in the gazette. The Supreme Court appointed an instructing magistrate (Juzgado de la
Sala de lo Constitucional) from within its ranks to oversee the case. That judge then—
according to the documents released post-ouster—issued the warrant to arrest Zelaya on
(it appears) June 26. The military, according to the terms of the warrant, were authorized
to arrest Zelaya, but the warrant does not authorize his removal from the country. Other
documents show that the warrant was initially made secret. On June 29, the day after
the coup, the Supreme Court voted to make the fact of the charges and the arrest warrant
public.
Questions have naturally been asked about just why it is that the military presented no
arrest warrant despite Supreme Court documents showing said warrant to have been
issued (albeit secretly) in advance of the ouster. The Wikileaked US Embassy cable is
no doubt causing consternation amongst members of the Supreme Court for the way
in which it discussed the warrant: “[C]oup supporters allege the court issued an arrest
8

Llorens-Koh cable, above note 6.
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warrant for disobeying its order to desist from the opinion poll…” (emphasis added).
The Embassy cable was sent by US Ambassador Hugo Llorens on 24 July 2009, almost
a full month after the ouster. This is surely enough time for something as basic as a court
document to be taken as a given by the Embassy within its analysis. Yet, Ambassador
Llorens uses the word “alleges,” which suggests he is not accepting as undisputed fact that
such warrant was issued by the Supreme Court. The Embassy memo also notes that “[a]
ccounts of Zelaya’s abduction by the military indicate he was never legally ‘served’ with
a warrant.” Thus, from the US Ambassador’s perspective, an alleged warrant was never
produced for Zelaya to see. Personally and speaking for myself as just one Commissioner,
I would be very interested to know whether Ambassador Llorens indeed had doubts, and
still has doubts, that the documents ordered released on June 29 by the Supreme Court
existed before the June 28 ouster.
Soon after the ouster, Congress met and, reportedly, a unanimity or a vast majority of
deputies voted to treat Zelaya as no longer President. The US Ambassador puts this ‘vote’
thus: “According to defenders of the ouster, Congress ‘unanimously’ (or in some versions
by a 123-5 vote) deposed Zelaya.” The Ambassador adds his own sidebar comment: “(after
the fact and under the cloak of secrecy)”. The President of Congress, Roberto Micheletti,
was sworn in as President, as he was next in line according to the constitutional line of
succession.
Congress’ action was based—it seems—on some unclear interpretation of Congress’
power to impeach. An express power to impeach does not appear in the current
Constitution, which instead only lists the power to “disapprove” (desaprobar). The
incapacitation of the President for having committed crimes is a ground for eventual
removal, but, as the US Embassy analysis notes, that is, by the Constitution, a judicial
process not a matter of Congressional fiat, and, even then, judicially-sanctioned removal
obviously depends on proof of the crimes after court proceedings with due process and so
on. Notwithstanding this, the Supreme Court at some point confirmed this was a lawful
constitutional succession.
Floating around in the justificatory discourse at an early point was a letter of resignation
that Zelaya had supposedly signed and left behind, but in the end this ‘letter’ (the
existence of which Zelaya denied) does not appear to have made its way into the formal
post-ouster record as part of the justification for his loss of power. This might have
something to do with the fact that the letter—if it physically ever existed—is generally
assumed to have been a forgery. Again according to the US Embassy Wikileaked analysis,
“the purported "resignation" letter was a fabrication and was not even the basis for
Congress's action of June 28.”
After the ouster, there was one line of what seemed to be clear unconstitutionality that
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various sectors appeared willing to entertain, namely, the actual military removal of
Zelaya from the country. The scenario of military scapegoats—possibly willingly so—was
clearly being speculated upon as one strategy for presenting everything done by the “coup
coalition” (a term discussed below) as having been constitutional, except this one slip by
the military. According to the line of speculation, it would be congenial to members of
the Supreme Court to point to the fact that the arrest warrant that emanated from their
court authorized only arrest, not forcible deportation.9 The final two sentences of the
US Embassy Wikileaked cable speaks volumes about this military-scapegoats scenario
as something being speculated about at that time (end of July 2009, a month after the
coup): “The coup's most ardent legal defenders have been unable to make the intellectual
leap from their arguments regarding Zelaya's alleged crimes to how those allegations
justified dragging him out of his bed in the night and flying him to Costa Rica. That the
Attorney General's office and the Supreme Court now reportedly question the legality of
that final step is encouraging and may provide a face-saving ‘out’ for the two opposing
sides in the current standoff.”
In the result, charges of abuse of power were brought by Honduras’ Fiscal General
(Attorney General) against six members of the military, including General Vasquez
Velasquez, in January 2010. All six were treated as holders of high state office sufficient
to trigger the Constitutional provisions requiring criminal charges to be heard by the
Supreme Court versus by the lower regular courts. The Supreme Court appointed its
President as the instructing magistrate. (This may turn out to mean that the President
of the Supreme Court appointed himself; the procedures for designating instructing
magistrates still need to be clarified.) The abuse-of-power charges were comparatively
minor (for example, they did not extend to treason, as had the charges against Zelaya
himself ). It also appears that the prosecutor did not bring any charges for the fact of the
detention of Zelaya, thereby taking as given its validity due to the Supreme Court arrest
warrant; nor does it appear that he was concerned that no warrant was presented at the
time of the detention. At the time, it was assumed by many that, even if convicted, the
officers would then be pardoned as about-to-be-inaugurated President Lobo had pledged
to put an amnesty law (for both Zelaya and anyone involved in his ouster) to Congress
once he was in office and, indeed, Congress may already have been discussing such a
law.10 This prospect of an amnesty would seem to have played into some expectation
9

Indeed, the Supreme Court not long after the ouster generated a package of documents which it put up
as a slide show on the Poder Judicial (Judicial Power/Authority) website, in an effort to defend itself as
not having been part of any coup; it wrote dozens of courts around the world (including the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in Hamburg…) asking for solidaristic support from the world’s judiciary
against accusations it had participated in the coup, and uploaded those letters and the one response it
apparently received (from the Supreme Court of Costa Rica, which simply thanked them for the letter
and noted it had been received).

10 Marc Lacey, “6 cited in Honduran leader’s ouster”, New York Times (July 7, 2010), available
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that these members of the military would not only be charged but would also be
convicted—and this played into the speculation hinted at by the US Ambassador that
herein would lie the “face-saving” way forward with the six member of the military taking
it on the chin for their excess. But, a few days before Lobo’s inauguration, the President
of the Supreme Court, in his capacity as Instructing Magistrate, dismissed the charges
as unfounded in law on the basis of reasoning related to a state of necessity. Within that
reasoning, he appears to have accepted their defence that they had removed Zelaya from
the country without malice and in the belief that his removal would prevent social unrest
and violence.11 So, what the US Ambassador saw as a possible scenario—an “out”—did
not transpire. The President of the Supreme Court declined to rule in a way that would
distinguish its behavior (the issuing of a warrant for arrest) from that of the military
(following arrest with expulsion). Everyone, it seems, had acted legally in Honduras—
except of course Zelaya, who remains under criminal indictment in the post-coup order.

B. INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS AND EFFORTS
There were a considerable number of distinct official reactions from international bodies
and other states. These reactions either called the event a coup and demanded that Zelaya
be permitted to return to Honduras and to re-assume office, or generated concerted
diplomatic efforts to broker a solution that would see Zelaya resume office in some sort
of transitional government and see out his term.12 The OAS had already been forewarned
f o r d ow n l o a d a t h t t p : / / w w w. n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 0 / 0 1 / 0 8 / w o r l d / a m e r i c a s / 0 8 h o n d u r a s .
html?ref=josemanuelzelaya (last accessed February 8, 2011). On January 29, 2011, another Wikileaks
cable was released, Cable 10TEGUCIGALPA16 FROM Ambassador Hugo Llorens, “CHARGES
FILED AGAINST MILITARY FOR FLYING ZELAYA OUT OF HONDURAS”, available at http://
www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2010/01/10TEGUCIGALPA16.html. See further reference to this cable in note
13 below.
11 Elizabeth Malkin, “Honduras: Court clears military officers of charges,” New York Times (January 27,
2010), available for download at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D00E2DA113AF934
A15752C0A9669D8B63 (last accessed February 8, 2011).
12 While there is a near unanimity amongst external actors (some Republicans in the US Congress
notwithstanding) that there was a coup, there is a spectrum of views on what constituted the coup.
Even within US government circles, we know of two diametrically different legal analyses. On the
one hand, a truly problematic legal memo (dated in August 2009) from a foreign law ‘expert’ working
with the Library of Congress concluded that the only unconstitutional conduct on the part of the
actors responsible for ousting Zelaya was the fact of forcibly flying him out of Honduras—due to
his constitutional mobility rights. American journalists to whom I have spoken say this memo was
sometimes on hand, or referred to, when Republican members of Congress were seeking to moderate
the rigour of the US’ response to the ouster. See Directorate of Legal Research for Foreign, Comparative
and International Law, Law Library of Congress, “Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues”, Report for
Congress LL File No. 2009-002965, August 2009 (prepared by Norma C Gutierrez, Senior Foreign Law
Specialist), available at http://schock.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Schock_CRS_Report_Honduras_FINAL.
pdf. On the other hand, the above-mentioned Wikileaked Embassy cable signed by the US Ambassador
contains a much more sophisticated and nuanced analysis which concludes that multiple violations of
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by Zelaya who had invoked an early-warning clause in the OAS’ Inter-American Charter
on Democracy, and, after the coup, a third-party clause in that Charter was invoked by
one or more other states. The Inter-American Charter on Democracy (which is not the
same thing as the foundational document OAS Charter, but a much later treaty) had
very much been born of the spirit of the times, once all Latin American governments
except Cuba had evolved into (at least formal) democracies. It is essentially a never-againmilitary-coups-and-dictatorial-rule treaty. Articles 1 and 2 give the general flavour when
they say, inter alia: “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their
governments have an obligation to promote and defend it. …The effective exercise of
representative democracy is the basis for the rule of law and of the constitutional regimes
of the member states of the Organization of American States.”
From an operational point of view, the Inter-American Charter on Democracy
establishes mechanisms for convening OAS institutions in the event of “unconstitutional
interruptions” or “alterations” in the democratic order, which terminology is clearly
intended to include coups d’état or, in Spanish, golpes de estado. Article 17 includes
provision for preventive appeal by a government when it feels its democratic order is
in jeopardy; Zelaya’s notice about his fears of a coup to the OAS, some months before
the aborted June 28 consultation, was an invocation of article 17. Article 20 allows
any member state of the OAS to convene the OAS’ Permanent Council after a coup
has occurred, which duly transpired when Venezuela (and perhaps also other states)
triggered the clause following Zelaya’s forcible deportation to Costa Rica. The OAS
Permanent Council gave the Micheletti government 72 hours to reverse what the
Council characterized as a coup and to restore the presidency to Zelaya. When this did
not happen, the OAS General Assembly suspended Honduras’ membership in the OAS
(which membership remains suspended). The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution
the constitution were part of the coup. No fewer than seven purported grounds of constitutionality
for the coup are analysed and found wanting, with at least one being characterized as a “fabrication”
(the supposed resignation letter from Zelaya) and another as a “canard” [spelled as “canard” in the
Embassy memo] (this being the argument raised after the ouster that the mere fact of Zelaya proposing
a constituent assembly automatically stripped him of the presidency). Interestingly, this memo was sent
towards the end of July—i.e. before the August Library of Congress memo had been generated. See
Llorens-Koh cable, above note 6. To date, I have seen no evidence that the Department of State used (let
alone released) this opinion to counter the use of the far-less-damning Library of Congress memo as an
authoritative legal analysis by Republican members of Congress. I am specifically interested to know
whether the Department of State shared this Embassy analysis, or other Department of State analyses
benefiting from the Embassy analysis, with the members of Congress including Senator John Kerry
who demanded that the Law Library of Congress memo be withdrawn in October 2009: see J A Jacobs,
“Law Library of Congress refusing to retract report on Honduras coup”, compendium of two newspaper
reports, November 1, 2011, available at http://freegovinfo.info/node/2796. The two newspaper reports
are Sarah Miley, Law Library of Congress refusing to retract report on Honduras coup: report, Jurist
(Oct 31, 2009), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/10/library-of-congress-refusingto-retract.php; and Lesley Clark, “Library of Congress stands by report on Honduras coup,” McClatchy
Newspapers (October 29, 2009).
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condemning what it specifically called a coup d’état. Bilateral pressure was applied from
the US, Europe and elsewhere—pressure that included stopping assistance payments. But
Micheletti and Congress held firm.
In a clear and detailed academic treatment of the coup and its aftermath, Professor
Thomas Legler of the Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City argues that a plausible
interpretation of the strategy of what he calls the “coup coalition” was to hold out
long enough to get to the already scheduled November elections (in which, as I have
already noted several times, Zelaya would not be a candidate).13 Legler surmises that the
coup coalition viewed the November elections as close enough in time that they could
withstand the external pressure. He finds evidence for this not just in the result, but in
terms of the way in which diplomatic negotiations with high-level mediation proceeded.
A series of diplomatically-mediated agreements between the Micheletti de facto presidency
and Zelaya were entered into. (Note that Zelaya had at one point slipped back into the
country and was being harboured at the Brazilian Embassy.) The bottom line was that
there was to be a national unity government with Zelaya appointees being some of the
ministers and with Zelaya remaining President to the end of his term—which was 30
January 2010, inauguration day for whoever would win the November 2009 presidential
elections. An omission in the agreements may have been deliberately treated as a loophole
for delay by Congress. According to the agreements, it was Congress that was to formally
invite back and restore Zelaya. However, no time frame was set on them doing so.
Congress considered the matter, and considered the matter, and …. time ran out.
13 Thomas Legler, “Coup Coalitions and the Collective Defence of Democracy in the Americas: The
Honduran Paradox”, Paper prepared for delivery at the 2010 Congress of the Latin American Studies
Association, Toronto, Canada October 6-9, 2010, available at http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/
congress-papers/lasa2010/files/1768.pdf. In terms of the notion of a “coup coalition” going well beyond
the military, this also appears to be the assessment in the above-cited US Embassy’s Wikleaked cable,
note 6, that contains the damning legal analysis of purported justifications for Zelaya’s ouster; that cable
concludes “the actions of June 28 can only be considered a coup d’etat by the legislative branch, with
the support of the judicial branch and the military, against the executive branch.” The more recent US
Embassy cable, note 10, contains the following observation by US Ambassador Llorens, when considering
new speculation in January 2010 that the Attorney General of Hondurans wanted to secure a conviction
of the military before any amnesty law came into effect, as the Attorney General was, speculation had
it, miffed that the military’s expulsion of Zelaya from the country had undercut his ability to continue
prosecuting Zelaya under the charges lodged on June 25, which he could have continued doing if Zelaya
had been taken into custody and kept in Honduras: “However, it is important to note the Supreme
Court, which will hear the case, played an important role in league with the military in the coup de ‘tat [sic]
of June 28.” (Recall the President of the Court ended up dismissing the case on his own.) The posture of
the Attorney General in relation to the military will need to be clarified. Such clarification will need to
include the tensions between the image of him acting as rule-of-law guardian and the US Ambassador’s
acceptance as fact that the Supreme Court colluded with the military. On the latter, the question arises:
if the Supreme Court colluded with the military and if it was the Attorney General’s June 25 laying of
charges that led to the “alleged” warrant (Llorens’ words in the first-released Wikileaks cable), (how)
was the Attorney General somehow outside the coup coalition despite having been the one to bring the
charges that were essential to the Supreme Court being “in league with” the military (again, per Llorens)?
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In the result, neither Zelaya nor any of his Ministers (re)entered Cabinet. (Note that,
apart from the delay in reinstating Zelaya, Zelaya also refused to name any ministers
until he was assured of being back in government.) The November elections for a
new President went ahead with Zelaya still sitting in the Brazilian embassy. Porfirio
(Pepe) Lobo, the National Party candidate, was elected. The OAS, the UN and other
organizations declined to send observer missions to the elections. The US, Canada,
Peru, Colombia and several neighbouring Central American states recognized the new
government as lawful and legitimate, while Brazil, Argentina, and of course Venezuela led
a group actively refusing to recognize. The international tussle over recognition continues,
alongside pressure being led by the US and Canada for lifting Honduras’ suspension from
the OAS.
Countries like Brazil and especially Argentina (and again, of course Venezuela) have—to
date—taken a very firm stand that allowing a coup to succeed in one country in the
Americas will turn on a green light for the military and associated partners in other
countries to consider doing the same thing. The experience in Venezuela obviously plays a
role in creating a sense of the susceptibility to coups. In the attempted coup in Venezuela
in 2002, the George W Bush Administration recognized the provisional government set
up by the coup before the coup was thwarted by forces loyal to President Chavez, who
was restored to power after being held in detention for two days. Informed observers
believe there is good evidence the US (including former Ambassador to Honduras, John
Negroponte, who was Ambassador from 1981-85) was actively involved in the coup, and
not simply recognizing it, while the US Department of State’s Inspector General gave the
US Department of State a clean bill of health.14 At the time of the Honduran coup itself,
this reasoning—the regional-historical precedential effects of the Honduran coup—was
emphasized time and again by most members of the OAS: if we let this happen, the
militaries and their socio-economic collaborators will be back and some of our states
will once again see coup-created regimes. I say “regional-historical here” and not worldhistorical because it was indeed the specific international law of the Americas that was
at stake and it was the specific worry of Latin American states about their own collective
backyard that drove concerns about the demonstrator effects.
That said, there were international reactions beyond OAS states, which may turn out
to be important for what they might suggest about a more globalized democracy norm.
For example, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon quickly condemned the June 28
14 Ed Vuilliamy, “Venezuela coup linked to Bush team: Specialists in the 'dirty wars' of the Eighties
encouraged the plotters who tried to topple President Chavez,” (April 21, 2011) The Observer, at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/apr/21/usa.venezuela; Embassy of the United States, Venezuela, Public
Affairs Office, “State Dept. Issues Report on U.S. Actions During Venezuelan Coup (Inspector General
finds U.S. officials acted properly during coup)”, Press release, July 30, 2002, at http://web.archive.org/
web/20061006053902/embajadausa.org.ve/wwwh1927.html
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ouster and the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 63/301 (1 July
2009), which referenced the fact of rupture of Honduras’ own constitutional order while
placing simultaneous emphasis on the democratic nature of that order that was being
undermined. Resolution 63/301 was adopted unanimously, without vote. It referenced
Inter-American regional law but did not simply invoke that law as the only internationallaw basis for the condemnation in the resolution. The UN General Assembly could
have chosen essentially to mirror the language found in Inter-American resolutions and
declarations, and thus to offer a kind of UN-level ‘rule of law’ support for the OAS
regional law of democracy. Instead, on my reading of UNGA Res 63/301, the UN took a
giant stride or two into world-historical support for defence-of-representative-democracy
as a global norm. The very title of the resolution, “Situation in Honduras: democracy
breakdown” (not “breakdown in constitutional order” nor “breach of Inter-American
law”) is suggestive that the UN General Assembly response to Honduras may be looked
back upon as a watershed moment in some sort of affirmation of a universal anti-coup
norm, at least where the constitutional system in place was already a democracy. All five
of its operative paragraphs are accordingly worth reproducing:
[The General Assembly]
1. Condemns the coup d’état in the Republic of Honduras that has interrupted
the democratic and constitutional order and the legitimate exercise of power in
Honduras, and resulted in the removal of the democratically elected President
of that country, Mr. José Manuel Zelaya Rosales;
2. Demands the immediate and unconditional restoration of the legitimate and
Constitutional Government of the President of the Republic of Honduras,
Mr. José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, and of the legally constituted authority in
Honduras, so that he may fulfil the mandate for which he was democratically
elected by the Honduran people;
3. Decides to call firmly and unequivocally upon States to recognize no
Government other than that of the Constitutional President, Mr. José Manuel
Zelaya Rosales;
4. Expresses its firm support for the regional efforts being undertaken pursuant to
Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations to resolve the political crisis
in Honduras;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the General Assembly in a timely
manner of the evolving situation in the country. 15
15 Admittedly, reading this 2009 General Assembly resolution as a breakthrough affirmation of a universal
anti-coup norm is not without its difficulties given changes in power that have gone uncondemned by the
General Assembly elsewhere in the world and given that amongst the UN member states that were part
of the General Assembly “unanimity” would have been a range of states not plausibly characterizable as
democracies—although the semantic pliability of the word “democratic” (People’s Democratic Republic
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As time wore on, and the Micheletti presidency and Congress weathered the storm of
external criticism and sanctions, a noticeable shift began to occur in terms of the issue at
stake. The focus shifted to whether the election of a new president in November 2009—
which election would be organized by an illegal coup government and which government
may have been holding out precisely to get to this point—should be recognized or
whether such recognition would also signal support for a coup. The concern from
countries such as Brazil was that recognition of a new Presidency in these circumstances
would provide a model or roadmap for other countries as to how to carry out what might
be called a cleansed coup. It is important to note that the US ultimately appeared not
to be concerned about such a precedent, as the US broke ranks even before the elections
when a key civil servant publicly hinted that the US would recognize whoever emerged as
President from the election. One interpretation of the reason for this is as follows, from
Thomas Legler:
Some sources suggest that the U.S. government’s decision to recognize the November 29
elections irrespective of whether Zelaya was returned to office was the quid pro quo in a
secret deal for which the Republican Party agreed to withdraw its senatorial opposition to
the nomination of Arturo Valenzuela as assistant secretary of state for Latin America and
Thomas Shannon as new ambassador to Brazil see (El Universal, December 23, 2009). 16

As you may have surmised, Zelaya was not suddenly asked to come back and serve out
of Korea, i.e. North Korea) and its overlap with the term “people” (People’s Republic of China) may be such
that these states were ‘happy’ to treat any military disturbance of constitutional order as condemnable
at the UN level (whether based on a rule of law or a democracy rationale). But what of recent changes
of power that have gone uncondemned? In terms of comparisons, we can recall that, in 2006, an even
more blatant military coup occurred in Thailand. Prime Minister Thaksin, who had rubbed traditional
political elites the wrong way with his own populism, was ousted and never returned to Thailand—I say
“returned” because he was actually attending a session of the UN General Assembly in New York when
the coup occurred. Not even that boldness on the part of the Thai coup coalition was enough to produce
a UN General Assembly resolution and there was comparatively little by way of official (states) outcry.
The regional norm there—represented by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—was
very much one of non-intervention in such ‘local’ matters, and this may well have been refracted onto
the UN level. All that said, in fast-moving times, perhaps the three year gap between Thailand in 2006
and Honduras in 2009 was enough for the normative terrain to have shifted—although one must still
cautiously keep in mind that the OAS regional law overlay may still be invoked, in Asia in particular, as
the distinguishing point between Honduras and Thailand.
16 Thomas Legler, “Coup Coalition” at footnote 9 in his paper. A journalist with a leading newspaper in the
US has also told me that s/he believes this quid pro quo to have taken place, but that proof of the deal
will be very difficult to turn up. We might also note with interest that the US approach seems to have a
precedent with respect to what the Inspector General of the US Department of State has found as a fact
(without condemning it as inappropriate) in relation to the Venezuela coup attempt of 2002: “Both the
Department and the embassy worked behind the scenes to persuade the interim government [created
by the coup] to hold early elections and to legitimize its provisional rule by obtaining the sanction of
the National Assembly and the Supreme Court.” See State Dept. Issues Report on U.S. Actions During
Venezuelan Coup” note 14.
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the last two months of his term remaining after the November elections. In December
2009, Congress, by a huge majority vote of deputies, voted not to invite Zelaya back.
Micheletti stayed in office. On inauguration day for Porfirio Lobo, Micheletti was asked
to stay away from the ceremony. Zelaya was escorted from the Brazilian Embassy to the
airport where Lobo saw him off, as he left the country for a second time. He remains
outside, and is still under the charges in the Supreme Court’s arrest warrant.

C. THE CREATION OF TWO COMMISSIONS IN 2010
On the day of the ouster—keeping in mind the world has treated it as a coup—many
thousands of people took to the streets of Tegucigalpa in what reports and testimonies
make clear was non-violent protest. Over time, this popular protest movement morphed
into a movement known as La Resistencia, with activity such as rallies and protest
marches all around the country. There have been clashes with security forces during such
assemblies. One of the original Resistencia leaders has been murdered as have others
active in the Resistencia. Palpable polarization has taken over society, perhaps especially
in Tegucigalpa. Meanwhile, there is also a polarization of the media, with the major daily
newspapers and TV tending to be held by economic actors who are generally assumed
to be on the conservative end of the political spectrum. Community radio tends to be
the vehicle most relied upon by La Resistencia as well as the Internet for people able to
access it. The use of “La Resistencía” to refer to a broad social movement with no initial
institutionalized form at some point also came to refer to a more organized resistance
movement, the Frente Nacional de Resistencía Popular, that has also begun to take on
qualities of an electorally oriented organization (although with much internal debate over
whether such transformation is desirable).17
The Plataforma de Derechos Humanos is a coalition of a half-dozen human rights
groups that received in late 2010 a human rights prize that is highly regarded in the
Americas—the 2010 Letelier-Moffit Human Rights Prize, named after a Chilean who
had been a diplomat (Ambassador to the US) for Chile under the Allende government
(Letelier), and who was assassinated in the streets of Washington DC by Pinochet’s
government in a car bombing that also killed development expert Ronni Moffitt. The
Plataforma alleges—with extensive and well-documented supporting evidence from
their own work and the reports of other national and international non-governmental
organizations, as well as reports from various state and intergovernmental sources—that
a significant number of serious human rights violations have occurred since the coup,
most intensive, it seems, during the Micheletti period but also continuing (and, it seems,
17 See the Frente’s website at http://resistenciahonduras.net/. The tendency in Honduras is to refer to “la
Frente” for the organization and “La Resistencía” for the wider social phenomenon, but this is not a
consistent practice either.
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even deepening in important respects) since Porfirio Lobo took power in January 2010
following the elections of November 2009. Human rights issues include: disappearances,
extrajudicial executions, widespread acts and threats of physical violence against human
rights defenders, journalists, members of the Resistencia, transsexuals, gay men (especially
those also associated with political activity), and members of land-reform campesino
movements (especially in a region called the Aguan); extensive violations of rights of
expression (with Honduras having the worst record for deaths of journalists in the world
in 2010), assembly and association, including in terms of how the November 2009
election campaign played out; and special vulnerability of persons identified with certain
social sectors, such as the gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered community.
Arising from all of this has been the creation by Porfirio Lobo of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y de Reconciliación, or CVR),
which began its work in May 2010.18 The establishment of a CVR was one of over a
dozen conditions in the agreements negotiated in the fall of 2009, mentioned earlier. It
seems likely that President Lobo understands that some states will view fulfillment of
this condition as a very important factor in their decisions as to whether to recognize
the Lobo government and/or lift Honduras’ suspension from the OAS. Its mandate is to
“clarify the facts that occurred before and after 28 June 2009, in order to identify the acts
that led to the crisis situation and to make proposals to the Honduran people in order to
avoid the repeat of such acts in the future.” It was to have reported in approximately eight
months and a report was expected by early 2011; the end of March 2011 or early April
2011 seems most likely at last indication.
The CVR is constituted by five members, three foreigners and two Hondurans. The
two Hondurans have both been President of the National Autonomous University of
Honduras; the inclusion of one seems to have been protested by some conservative
sectors and the other from within the Resistencia-oriented sector. A Peruvian judge and
a former Canadian Ambassador to the US are joined by a Guatemalan Chair, Eduardo
Stein, a former vice-president of Guatemala. By their mandate, they have full access
to all executive branch documentation, subject to later, at the time of the report, not
being able to reveal state-sensitive information and being required to provide copies of
corresponding documents to the OAS for safeguarding before those documents can be
made public in 10 years.
On several occasions, the CVR’s chair, Mr Stein, has made public statements seeking to
alleviate concerns that, because of the wording of the CVR mandate, the CVR is not
going to look seriously at human rights violations since the coup. Underlying this fear, for
some, would appear to be a concern that the CVR may be more attuned to the political
18 The CVR’s website is http://www.cvr.hn.
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tensions surrounding and generated by the coup and more oriented toward elite-level
reconciliation. Stein has emphasized that human rights violations are part of the CVR’s
inquiry—albeit only up to the start of the Lobo Presidency and thus with no coverage of
the period since February 2010 to present.
It is fair to say that deep mutual distrust within a polarized society is a defining feature of
Honduras at present. It is perhaps thus not surprising that the Plataforma de Derechos
Humanos decided to constitute its own body, called simply the Comisión de Verdad
(CV), or Truth Commission.19 At the time of the announcement of the plan to establish
the CV, in spring 2010, Amnesty International appears also to have called for such a
civil society commission. At that time, criticisms were made of the official CVR for not
meeting now well established best practices standards generated from the experience
of, and reflection on, some 70+ truth-related commissions that have been convened
worldwide since the early 1980s. The lack of provision for witness protection within the
CVR is high on the priority list of criticized gaps.
The mandate of the unofficial, civil society CV starts with preambular sections, some
elements of which are worth noting for their philosophical relevance to some of the
subsequent discussion. The CV is constituted in order that “never again” shall human
rights violations occur following a “golpe de estado” (coup d’ état) and in order that any
crimes committed be clarified and not allowed to enjoy impunity. The documentation of
la memoria histórica is an essential part of the affirmation of human rights as well as of the
construction of a new institutional order. Philosophically, the mandate states, “Sin verdad
ni justicia no será posible la reconciliación de la familia hondureña.”—Without either truth
or justice, reconciliation of the Honduran family will not be possible.
The CV’s mandate then sets out a series of objectives, which include (in my own,
provisional translation from the Spanish document):
• The CV shall investigate and establish the human rights violations that were
occasioned by the coup of 28 June 2009, and those that have continued to be
perpetrated until the end of the CV’s mandate, identifying, where possible, the
persons responsible.
• The CV shall investigate and establish patterns of aggression and of the persecution to
which human rights defenders and social leaders who promote structural change have
been subjected, identifying the persons responsible.

19 The CV’s website is http://www.comisiondeverdadhonduras.org. In Spanish “de verdad” without “la”
(as in “de la verdad”) can mean both “real” (or “true”) and “truth”—thus the Comisión de Verdad’s is
formally intended to mean Truth Commission but, at another level, it could also mean the Real (True)
Commission.
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• The CV shall assess the consequences of impunity and of the structures of repression
that continue to operate in the country since the 1980s, and identify the mechanisms
of impunity for past crimes that have permitted previous human rights violators to
revive their activities within the setting of the coup.
• The CV shall identify the antecedents of the coup, the structural, institutional,
economic and historical causes of the coup, and the actors that promoted and justified
the coup; in this context, the CV shall analyze and identify, inter alia, foreign interests
that appeased and supported the coup.
• The CV shall make proposals for victims to be able to assert their right to the truth,
to justice and to remedies. The CV shall formulate recommendations that permit
remedies for the victims, establishing measures, both individual and collective,
for non-repetition, for restoration of rights, for redress, for rehabilitation and for
compensation.
• The CV shall identify each state institution’s role in and linkage to the coup and
human rights violations, whether by acts or by omissions. The CV shall thereupon
make recommendations for removal from state institutions of all those persons
who promoted or participated in the coup and who permitted or participated in
human rights violations. The CV shall identify the corresponding civil and criminal
responsibility.
• The CV shall write a report containing all of the preceding elements, which report
will be presented to the Honduran people and to state institutions, in order that they
may take up the recommendations, and the CV shall then distribute the report widely
within the international community, in particular to the United Nations, the OAS,
the European Union, and the International Criminal Court.
• A standing international body shall then be established to monitor, observe,
take action, and provide the necessary advice to ensure compliance with the
recommendations of the Truth Commission.
In terms of membership, we were constituted with 10 commissioners, eight foreigners
and two Hondurans. Our Chair is Sister Elsie Monje from Ecuador who has just finished
chairing a truth commission in Ecuador—an official one set up by the state—into the
human rights abuses of the 1980s in that country. Two other highly regarded members
of the Catholic clergy, a Honduran and a Belgian, were named to the commission. The
second Honduran is a leading literature scholar and a well-known national cultural
figure. Also on the CV, apart from myself, are a former Costa Rican Ambassador to the
Netherlands (who also served as President of the UN Human Rights Committee for a
period), an El Salvadoran judge, a Spanish judge who is an expert in the functioning
of civil law judicial systems and international human rights law, a Nobel Peace Prize
Laureate from Argentina, and one of the co-founders of Argentina’s Mothers of the Plaza
del Mayo movement.
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The CV intends to cover events up to June 28 of next year (the second anniversary) and
release our report by the end of 2011. Our first meeting straddled the first anniversary of
the ouster, June 28 of this year, and we met again at the end of October and into early
November. The plenary commission will return twice more before the second anniversary
of the ouster, with the report preparation schedule from July 2011 yet to be finalized.

IV. SRI LANKA
A. SRI LANKA’S MAELSTROM
Sri Lanka is both better known and better documented at both intergovernmental
levels—notably within the UN but also by the EU—and at NGO levels, with a slew of
reports in the last two years. You may want to go to the Sri Lanka Campaign website—
www.srilankacampaign.org—where you can not only access (from the home page “Learn
More” section) several key reports from the International Crisis Group (ICG), Amnesty
International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Committee to Protect
Journalists, but also a document by the Sri Lanka Campaign itself, that I helped prepare
with a former Osgoode student, James Yap. It is called “The Breakdown of the Rule of
Law in Sri Lanka: An Overview” and is a synthesis of work done by a dozen or so other
organizations, within the Campaign’s own overarching and decidedly critical interpretive
argument about (what SL Campaign Advisor and Executive Director of the Hong Kongbased Asian Human Rights Commission, Basil Fernando, has analyzed in his own
publications as) the situation of “abysmal lawlessness” in Sri Lanka.20
It is important to note that “The Breakdown of the Rule of Law” is not specifically
about the war or the last months of the conduct of the war. Rather, it is a more general
assessment within a wider time frame of the current breakdown of the rule of law in Sri
Lanka. That said, it is exceedingly relevant for the question of what challenges there are
within post-war Sri Lanka for dealing with allegations of war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed by both government forces and the LTTE on the battlefield during
the final stages of the war. More generally, the Sri Lanka Campaign’s overview synthesis
may help show that the whats, whys and hows of human rights violations during the
final conflict and in the detention-camp policies after the war cannot be fully understood
without looking at the wider rule of law situation, both in terms of the development of
the situation over time and in terms of how structures of accountability work—or don’t
work—outside the immediate context of accountability for the conduct of warfare.

20 James Yap and Craig Scott, “The Breakdown of the Rule of Law in Sri Lanka: An Overview” (September
22, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682133.
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For those of you not that familiar with Sri Lanka, I will attempt to give you an almost
physical sense of the maelstrom in which Sri Lankans have been living for many decades.
The years have been dominated by tensions and conflict with a clear ethnic dimension
that have seen contestations for political and social space, and contestations over various
myths, between a majority Sinhala-speaking and Buddhist Sinhalese population and
a minority Tamil-speaking population from a mix of Hindu, Christian and Muslim
religious heritages. At the same time, it would be a mistake to chalk up the grand sweep
of modern Sri Lankan history to this single axis of conflict, as, for different periods
and increasingly for the present period as well, state repression has to some extent been
society-wide cutting across communities.
I mentioned the metaphor of the maelstrom. Hold your breath now for perhaps the
longest single-sentence descent into a vortex in the history of lecturing—or at least the
history of lectures at CTLS. …
Policies of placing more emphasis on Sinhala, the language of the Sinhalese community,
after the end of British colonialism 60 years ago;
decisions to reform the constitutional order with many pointing to the 1978 constitution
as the watershed moment for the ever-deepening increase in executive power in Sri Lanka;
experience and perceptions of Tamils of life or government as being one of dominance
by Sinhalese and, to an extent, increasingly militant Buddhism, or, more positively put,
as lacking sufficient recognition either of Tamil distinctiveness as a minority or Tamil
contributions to the wider nation;
the intermingling of such factors with an existing high concentration of Tamil-speakers
in the North and Northeast bolstered by the outflow of Tamils from Colombo and other
areas to the North as a consequence of either race riots at different points or, at least in
1983, something much closer to a pogrom;
the creation of an organization in the 1970s that would eventually settle on the name
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the LTTE, and that at a certain point made its goal the
armed achievement of a sovereign-state homeland in the north/north-east of the country;
the rise of military, police, and paramilitary repression starting in the 1970s, which has
waxed and waned ever since;
the unique combination of conventional warfare capacities and recourse to urban
terrorism by the LTTE;
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all too frequently, a general ruthlessness and brutality as a method of governance and
control from both the state and the LTTE;
a meaningful but still limited cross-ethnic interaction in society and politics which, along
with moderate sentiments in all communities, has tended to be pushed aside by extremist
and chauvinist elements in those communities;
independent dynamics within the Sinhalese community, especially involving politicians’
and parties’ rivalries that have tended to surge and to undermine the few occasions when
peace negotiations seemed to have some potential;
similar dynamics in the Tamil community, including due to the treatment at different
times of Muslim Tamils amounting to ethnic cleansing from some areas of the North,
and also including the split of the so-called Karuna faction and its substantial combat
forces from the overall LTTE, as well as the legacy for current paramilitary violence of
that faction;
externalized dimensions of the conflict that includes a worldwide network of diasporic
Sri Lankan Tamils that has provided communities to receive significant outflows of
Tamil refugees and more general migration, but from within which the LTTE also found
significant financial support;
further externalized dimensions in the form of Sri Lanka’s rise over the decades within
the grouping of states called the Non-Aligned Movement or NAM to become one of the
recognized leaders of this grouping of over 100 states from which the government has
been able to draw diplomatic support when needed;
and—finally the big “and”—a ceasefire in the early 2000s that led to an almost desperate
attempt by the world diplomatic community led by Norway to leverage the ceasefire into
successful peace negotiations that would lead to some form of quasi-federal or federal
autonomy in the North which would be acceptable to the central government but which,
by around 2006 had clearly failed, and which ultimately helped pave the way to the
election of the current President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who stated to the UN
General Assembly in 2006 his hope to make another push for a comprehensive peace
that addressed minority concerns within a unified Sri Lanka, but who in the end seems
at some point to have concluded that military victory—indeed a total military victory—
over the LTTE was the only solution—
ALL this (and this is the start of the principal clause in the sentence, by the way) reached
a crescendo with the gradual strangling of the LTTE strongholds over the course of a two
to three year military campaign that, in the last months of the war in early 2009, saw a
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couple hundred thousand civilians crowded into a coastal strip alongside the surrounded
LTTE who physically blocked their escape even as the army bombarded the strip with
artillery incessantly, with few pauses, in what must have been near-certain knowledge
of the “collateral damage” that would be wrought on the civilians densely clustered in
the targeted so-called “no-fire zones”, followed by an eventual surrender of the LTTE
but not before anywhere from 7000 civilians (on some estimates) to many more (on
other estimates) had been killed, let alone the many who were maimed, and with an
aftermath that saw close to 300,000 civilians locked away for many months in a series of
internment camps and somewhere in the neighbourhood of 10,000 LTTE or suspected
LTTE members shunted to their own off-limits detention facilities where about half of
them still remain after the release of some hundreds of children from their ranks and the
eventual release (subject to restrictions on movement) of about 5000 of those deemed less
‘hard-core’ by the government.

END OF SENTENCE.
Are any of you still breathing? I hope this experience of the world’s most grueling
sentences ever given in a lecture has helped you imagine how it has felt for many Sri
Lankans both over the decades and more recently as they all hurtled toward the final end
game on the eastern shores of Sri Lanka after 35 years of deep and intractable conflict.
B. RESPONSES TO THE WARFARE AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR
But the world did not applaud. Criticism from states, from within the UN, from the
EU, from a phalanx of NGOs, from media commentators must have seemed relentless
in the eyes of the government. The criticism started when it became clear by late 2008
how many civilians were going to be sideswept in the intensifying battlefield warfare and
mounted when it became clear how thoroughly the gloves of international humanitarian
law and international human rights law had been ripped off—by both sides in the
warfare. By and large, the government of Sri Lanka did not heed the cries, both denying
any reason for concern and keeping media and others from the war zones such that
third-party reports could be characterized as conjecture or LTTE propaganda. After
the surrender, new concern over the detention camps turned quickly to a new wave of
external criticism, and soon demands for war crimes investigations were being called for
from many quarters. In October 2009, the War Crimes Office of the US DOS produced
a report for Congress identifying something like 300 possible war crimes incidents.21 Ten
months later, in August 2010, the War Crimes Office issued a follow-up report updating
21 Office of War Crimes Issues, US Department of State, Report To Congress on Incidents During
the Recent Conflict in Sri Lanka, October 22, 2009, at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/131025.pdf (last accessed January 31, 2011).
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Congress on what Sri Lanka had done in response to the previous report.22 Here is an
extract from the August description:
Immediately following the release of the October 2009 Department of State report [on
crimes against humanity during the war in Sri Lanka] to Congress, Sri Lankan President
Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed a “Group of Eminent Persons” to look into the allegations
in the U.S. report and prepare a report for him with its recommendations. The group’s
report was initially due to President Rajapaksa on December 31, 2009, but the due date was
subsequently delayed to April 2010 and then again to July 2010. …
The Department of State concludes that the Group of Eminent Persons was ineffective. The
Department of State received conflicting reports about the progress of the Group’s inquiry,
and confirmed in May that it had not been active for months and that its mandate had been
subsumed by the new commission. The Department of State is not aware of any findings or
reports of the Group. The Group did not appear to investigate allegations or to make any
recommendations pursuant to its mandate.
On May 15, [2010] President Rajapaksa issued a warrant to establish an eight-member
commission under the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1978. The
warrant did not explicitly direct the commission to identify violations of internationally accepted
norms in conflict situations or to identify those responsible. … Since then, the Government of Sri
Lanka has clarified the mandate of the LLRC in private conversations with U.S. Government
officials (although it has not yet done so publicly).
On June 10, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense announced that President Rajapaksa had
met with the members of the Commission on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation on June 4.
The Ministry’s announcement said that the President had informed commission members they
had “the responsibility of acting in a forward-looking manner, through focus on restorative
justice designed to further strengthen national amity.” The statement further noted that
the President encouraged the members to “utilize their wide-ranging mandate to fulfil this
objective, while always safeguarding the dignity of Sri Lanka.” …
Evaluating the effectiveness of the CoI should first take into account the history of
failings of a series of past CoIs established in Sri Lanka. For example, a 2006 commission
charged with investigating sixteen allegations of serious human rights violations ultimately
partially investigated only seven of the cases and did not identify any of the perpetrators.
An International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) invited by President
Rajapaksa to observe the local commission resigned after concluding that the GSL lacked

22 See also the Office of War Crimes’ follow-up report in August 2010 in which it expresses serious
misgivings about the LLRC: Office of War Crimes Issues, US Department of State, Report To Congress
on Measures Taken by the Government of Sri Lanka and International Bodies To Investigate Incidents
During the Recent Conflict in Sri Lanka, and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Such Efforts, August 11,
2010, at http://www.state.gov/s/wci/srilanka/releases/145884.htm (last accessed January 31, 2011).
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the political will to properly pursue the investigations and that the commission was not
meeting international standards in areas such as witness protection, transparency, and
financial commitment to the commission. The IIGEP was especially critical concerning
a severe conflict of interest by the Attorney General’s office, which both represented the
GSL and led questioning during hearings. The then incumbent Attorney General, who in that
capacity was criticized for obstructing the IIGEP’s work, has been appointed as Chairman of the
LLRC.

Not mentioned in the above narrative by the War Crimes Office of the State Department
is how UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon announced in early 2009 that he would
create a high-level Panel to advise him on how the UN should proceed with respect to
the allegations of war crimes.23 Against Sri Lanka’s vehement objections, he went on to
name the panel, which officially started its work in mid-September 2010 and is working
towards a report by, it seems, February 2011. Sri Lanka initially barred entry to Sri Lanka
of the Panel’s three members, and only relented towards the end of 2010—saying that it
would allow them in to meet with the LLRC.
Meanwhile, the LRRC has started its work with hearings in various locales. 24 It issued
23 BBC News, “UN chief sets up panel on Sri Lanka war” (June 22 2010), at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/10384964; Matthew Russell Lee, “As Sri Lanka Panel Meets With Nambiar, 4 Month Clock
Frozen, Pillay's Office Will Staff”, Inner City Press (July 20, 2010), at http://www.innercitypress.com/
sri2experts072010.html; “Secretary-General Holds First Meeting with Panel of Experts,” UN Doc SG/
SM/13104 (September 17, 2010) at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sgsm13104.doc.htm.
24 To see the names of the LLRC Commissioners and the Warrant issued by President Rajapaksa that sets
out the LLRC mandate, see Government of Sri Lanka, “Sri Lanka: President appoints Lessons Learnt
and Reconciliation Commission (May 17, 2010)”, reproduced at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/
db900SID/SNAA-85K8EL?OpenDocument and also the LLRC website at http://www.llrc.lk/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=27&Itemid=54 (the mandate in three languages) and http://
www.llrc.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18&Itemid=2 (the list and professions of
the commissioners).
Transcripts of some submissions/testimony are published on the LLRC’s website at http://www.llrc.
lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35&Itemid=57 (for sessions known as “public
sittings”) and at http://www.llrc.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=26&Itemid=5
6 (for “field visits”). On the field visits web page, the LLRC comments that there are no transcripts for
in-camera proceedings—which seem to include, for example, a September 20, 2010, visit of the LLRC
to the Mullaitivu Security Forces Headquarters and October 2 and 3, 2010, visits to the Omanthai
Detention Centre. With respect to the public sittings web page, instructions at the top of the page
say: “Public Sittings (click on each name to read transcript)”. However, not all names are hyperlinked.
As of February 3, 2011, the present author counted 148 names listed as having made submissions/
presentations. Of these 148 names, there are hyperlinks for 112 of them but 36 were not hyperlinked—and thus there is currently no access via the LLRC to these presentations/testimonies. I can
find no explanation on the LLRC website as to the reasons for the lack of hyperlinks to these 36—e.
g. whether this is due to a delay in preparing a transcript, whether there are security reasons, and so on.
Some of the testimonies for which there are no links include presentations from notables such the (former)
highly regarded Judge on the International Court of Justice Christopher Weeramantry, Bishop Daniel
Thiagarajah of the Jaffna Diocese, and former Air Vice Marshal V. Tennakoon.
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an invitation to various NGOs to testify, including to Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group—the big three of muscular global
humanitarian NGOs—all of which had been very scrutinous and critical for some time
of Sri Lanka and notably with respect to the last stages of the war and its aftermath.
The three heads of these three NGOs sent a joint letter to the Chair of the LRRC on 14
October 2010, in which they collectively declined the invitation. The letter is well worth
reading as it contains a condensed version of some of the main lines of criticism about the
general rule of law situation in Sri Lanka and the reasons they have for not thinking this
Commission was serious.25

Apparently as a response to these gaps, on January 17, 2011, a citizens-journalism website, Groundviews.
org, launched its own archive of documentation from and about the LLRC (including an archive of
submissions and testimonies, and an archive of media reports). The announcement with reasons for
the creation of the archive is at http://groundviews.org/2011/01/17/archive-of-lessons-learnt-andreconciliation-commission-llrc-submissions-and-media-reports/ while the archive itself is at http://
groundviews.org/llrc-media-coverage-and-submissions/. At the former URL, the following appears:
“The archives respond to numerous requests we got for a single-window access to this content. The
content included in the archives are generated by a trusted source outside the country by going through
information on the web, including the LLRC’s official website. New submissions and media reports, once
sent to Groundviews, are uploaded to the archive and curated by us.” At the latter URL, the following
appears: “Biased and incomplete media coverage of submissions made to Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) has made it difficult to know what information has been provided
to the commissioners and how, if at all, they have responded. Deliberate misreporting by leading
mainstream media in Sri Lanka has further complicated finding accurate versions of submissions to the
LLRC. While the LLRC’s own website, launched well after the hearings started, includes a large number
of transcripts of its hearings, it does not provide a comprehensive list of all oral and written submissions.”
The present author has not yet been able to thoroughly cross-check the transcripts that appear on the
LLRC site with those appearing on the Groundviews site in order to understand disparities in numbers
and coverage. The last digest of submissions on the Groundviews site lists 75 submissions taken from the
LLRC site (which is 37 less than the current number—112—of submissions that have links on the LLRC
site). On the other hand, there is a close correspondence in the number of names without hyperlinks on
the LLRC site (36) and the number of names for which Groundviews has uploaded submissions from
sources other than the LLRC (35, being 8 from unattributed sources and 27 from sources such as the
Sri Lanka Guardian, Asia Tribune, Transcurrents, Lanka Web, Groundviews itself, and even three from
“Government of Sri Lanka Website.” For example, the Weeramantry and Thiagarajah submissions are
sourced, respectively, from Transcurrents (and turned into a Google Doc by Groundviews at https://
docs.google.com/leaf?id=0Bxbk4wYolphwYmU2Y2ExMjMtNWI0MS00MjMwLWE5ZWUtYmJkZ
DI5MDc1NGUz&hl=en&authkey=CPGEldIN) and Sri Lanka Watch (and turned into a Google Doc
by Groundviews at https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=explorer&chrome=true&srcid=0Bxbk4
wYolphwOGE2NTMwNTItNzQ2My00ZWJlLWJjNzUtOTM3NDZlMmUwYTdk&hl=e). But the
Tennakoon testimony that had no hyperlink on the LLRC site has apparently not been sourced yet by
Groundviews from any other source. The author has not yet had time to compare the list of 36 nonhyperlinked names from the LLRC site line up with the 35 names for whom alternative sources were
used by Groundviews.
25 The letter is reproduced in full on all three NGOs' websites. See e.g. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/
publication-type/media-releases/2010/asia/sri-lanka-crisis-group-refuses-to-appear-before-flawedcommission.aspx. At the end of the letter, an appendix is added of the three organizations’ recent
publications on Sri Lanka, which is convenient digest: see the URL ibid.
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Did I say earlier the world did not applaud? It turns out that was actually an
overstatement. There does indeed appear to have been clapping in some quarters—and
perhaps in many more governments than have made their real views public, notably form
military, security and intelligence apparatuses of such governments.
Recall that I discussed in the Honduran context the regional-level precedent concerns—
what political scientists tend to call the “moral hazard” of the OAS community allowing
the ouster of Zelaya to prevail. In many respects, I believe that the manner in which the
war in Sri Lanka was conducted and the blurring of those methods with the general rule
of law situation in Sri Lanka represents a much more worldwide moral hazard, even as it
is perhaps most acutely relevant elsewhere in Asia where more governments seem to be
actively consulting with Sri Lanka on ‘lessons learned’ in fighting ‘insurgents’ or ‘terrorists’.
When I joined the Sri Lanka Campaign in spring 2009 as Advisor and also as one of
three members of the Campaign Steering Committee, I expressed my central reason for
doing so as follows (and this is what appears on the Campaign website):
I am … deeply worried about the demonstrator effects of the Sri Lankan government’s
exploitation of security discourses to justify its methods and policies; there are already signs
of other governments seeking to emulate the Sri Lankan ‘model’.

Others have analyzed the importance of Sri Lanka in similar terms. Recently, in August,
The Elders issued a statement entitled “Sri Lanka’s disturbing actions met by ‘deafening
global silence.’” The Elders, as you may know, are an independent group of global leaders,
brought together by Nelson Mandela in 2007, who offer their collective influence and
experience to support peace-building, help address major causes of human suffering and
promote the shared interests of humanity. The current Elders are Martti Ahtisaari, Kofi
Annan, Ela Bhatt, Lakhdar Brahimi, Gro Brundtland, Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
Jimmy Carter, Graça Machel, Mary Robinson and Desmond Tutu (Chair). Nelson
Mandela and Aung San Suu Kyi are honorary Elders. Their statement on Sri Lanka begins
“The Sri Lankan government’s clampdown on domestic critics and its disdain for human
rights deserves a far tougher response according to The Elders….” Returning to the issue
of precedent or the “moral hazard” of leaving Sri Lanka unaddressed, Martti Ahtisaari,
the former President of Finland, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and a noted peace negotiator
who was central, inter alia, to the ending of the NATO-Serbia War over Kosovo, stated:
Countries operating outside international norms watch each other carefully. They will be
taking courage from Sri Lanka’s apparent success at avoiding international reproach. This is
a worry for all those who want to see more democracy, greater respect for human rights and
less violence in the world.
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The Economist put the matter as follows on 22 May 2010:26
Some of the world’s less savoury regimes are beating a path to [Colombo’s] door to study
"the Sri Lanka option".
Last November, Myanmar’s military dictator, Than Shwe, who rarely travels abroad, visited
the island "so that his regime can apply any lessons learned to its efforts against the ethnic
groups in Burma," says Benedict Rogers, a biographer of General Than.

After then mentioning interest also shown by Bangladesh and Thailand, the Economist
continues:
Behind the scenes, hawkish generals and politicians from Colombia to Israel seem to be
using Sri Lanka’s experience to justify harsher anti-terror operations.
Louise Arbour, head of the International Crisis Group (ICG), says the Sri Lanka model
consists of three parts: what she dubs "scorched-earth tactics" (full operational freedom for
the army, no negotiations with terrorists, no ceasefires to let them regroup); next, ignoring
differences between combatants and non-combatants (the new ICG report documents
many such examples); lastly, the dismissal of international and media concerns. A senior
official in President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s office, quoted anonymously in a journal,Indian
Defence Review, says "we had to ensure that we regulated the media. We didn’t want the
international community to force peace negotiations on us." The author of that article,
V.K. Shashikumar, concludes that "in the final analysis the Rajapaksa model is based
on a military precept …Terrorism has to be wiped out militarily and cannot be tackled
politically."

Very early on after the war, Sri Lanka appeared to be taking signals from these signs of
welcome for its terrorism-fighting ‘model’ and seeking to leverage them into an eventual
legitimizing strategy for the methods used. Note in particular, the elliptical foray of
President Rajapaksa in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2010, when
he obliquely but nonetheless quite clearly called for revising the laws of war in light of the
Sri Lanka experience.27 He set the scene as follows:
The rapidly forgotten truth is that we had to face one of the most brutal, highly organized,
well funded and effective terrorist organizations, that could even spread its tentacles to
other countries.…

26 “Sri Lanka politics: Friends like these,” The Economist (May 22, 2010), at http://www.eiu.com/
index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=1647142749&region_id=420000442&country_
id=900000290&refm=vwCtry&page_title=Latest+analysis&rf=0
27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, “Sri Lanka pursues nation-wide agenda of renewal—President”,
excerpts from President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s speech to the UN General Assembly, September 23, 2010,
at http://www.slmfa.gov.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2517&Itemid=75
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Many of the atrocities of terrorism that the West has come to experience in recent times,
the people of Sri Lanka were themselves the victims of, for nearly 30 years, losing almost
one hundred thousand lives…

And then a few paragraphs later, he drops in the following, only to leave it unelaborated:
In this context, it is worth examining the capacity of current international humanitarian
law to meet contemporary needs. It must be remembered that such law evolved essentially
in response to conflicts waged by the forces of legally constituted States, and not terrorist
groups. The asymmetrical nature of conflicts initiated by non-state actors gives rise to
serious problems which need to be considered in earnest by the international community.

V. THREE QUANDARIES
I proceed now to a tree-tops discussion of the three quandaries set out in the
introduction.
A. THE INSIDE/OUTSIDE QUANDARY
In establishing truth in a national context, what account must be taken of internal/
external dynamics related to both facts and perceptions concerning outside involvement,
including facts and perceptions associated with state-sovereigntist beliefs?
Transnationalization, however one understands this notion, automatically raises issues or
perceptions of issues generated by an inside/outside dynamic. Nobody likes an outsider,
or a perceived outsider, making something their business that we think is none of their
business. And so it is also with states and national societies.
In contrast to the assumptions of many who study, write about or facilitate globalization
whether of widgets or of grand ideas, it is arguable that sensitivities to outsiders are
becoming more ascendant in our times as more and more states and their societies in the
Global South acquire more and more power and leverage and more and more associated
pride and confidence. I don’t see this trend going away, but, rather, only deepening. Thus,
for normatively justified or at least normatively understandable reasons and for reasons
having more to do with political manipulation by state or other elites, transnationalizing
something as contentious and potentially explosive as ‘the truth’ about alleged human
rights violations or war crimes necessarily requires us to ask hard questions about
normative imposition and institutional coercion.
On the one hand, this is a pragmatic consideration, a fact of life that must be taken
into account from an effectiveness perspective: how can positive change be produced
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when nationalist or sub-societal sectoral resistance is not just a natural instinct but
a highly salient force that is in play? On the other hand, it is also about legitimacy,
for all the reasons we understand there are principled underpinnings to the notion of
the self-determination of peoples and within a more generalized ethic of presumptive
respect for others (including others’ self-understandings, even when ‘we’ believe ‘they’
are clearly wrong). And, finally, at a legal level, it brings us hard up against that thing
called sovereignty that tends to get converted by state elites, not surprisingly, into state
sovereignty, which, following what I said a short moment ago, is being more and more
valued by more and more states in the Global South as the bedrock of the international
legal system in a turn away from easy understandings that that system has by now
somehow evolved inexorably to take on significant supra-state dimensions in the realm
of the fundamental values underpinning both international humanitarian law and
international human rights law.
Against that backdrop, consider the following stark contrast in viewpoint. First, consider
the following 8 June 2010 observations and institutional prescription for dealing
with the conduct of the war in Sri Lanka by Louise Arbour, former Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and former UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights and currently President of the International Crisis
Group:28
The long history of impunity, the legitimate fear of reprisals on the part of prospective
witnesses and the persistent denial at the highest levels of government of any wrongdoing
suggest that only an arms-length international process would be credible.
An international investigation is required to ensure that Sri Lanka rebuilds itself on the
solid foundation of the rule of law including the fundamental principle that no one is above
the law. It is also necessary to ensure that the future rests on a truthful acknowledgment of
the past and that all the people of Sri Lanka understand what was done, seemingly on their
behalf, to their fellow citizens, many of whom were innocent civilians trapped between a
terrorist movement and a government unwilling to extend to them the protection to which
they were entitled by law. The nature and the magnitude of the crimes are such that there is
no prospect of a real, durable peace without justice.
Such an investigation is also necessary to reaffirm the international community's
commitment to the principle of accountability for serious violations of international
humanitarian law. This is particularly pressing since the "Sri Lankan option" may otherwise
become increasingly attractive to those governments that will find it expedient to disregard
the law if they are convinced that they may do so with impunity.

28 Louise Arbour, “Sri Lanka still demands justice », June 8, 2010, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/
asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/arbour-sri-lanka-still-demands-justice.aspx
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In contrast, three months later on 23 September 2010, Sri Lanka’s President Rajapaksa
said the following to the UN General Assembly in the same speech noted at the end of
section IV:
Sri Lanka recognizes the challenges we face, among the greatest of which is healing the
wounds of the recent past. To this end, earlier this year, a Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation
Commission has been established, giving full expression to the principles of accountability.
This independent Commission, comprising eight Sri Lankans of eminence and stature, has
already begun its work. …
We believe that for the rebuilding and healing of our nation to succeed, the process must
evolve from within. If history has taught us one thing, it is that imposed external solutions
breed resentment and ultimately fail. Ours, by contrast, is a home grown process, which
reflects the culture and traditions of our people.
We certainly welcome the support of the international community as we rebuild our lands
and our economy. We sincerely hope that they will be prepared to take a practical approach
to developing partnerships with Sri Lanka through international trade, investment and
capacity building.

It will be immediately noticed that an internal/external dynamic is central to the
President’s articulation and that a clear line is drawn that leaves matters of justice,
reconciliation, and, one assumes also, even free-standing truth outside the institutional
realm of the “international community.” He references both illegitimacy (we are handling
this as Sri Lankans and “external imposed solutions” will breed resentment) and the
ineffectiveness that flows from illegitimacy (resentment leads to resistance which leads
to failure). That is all I will say for now before moving to the next quandary, other than
to editorialize that, in the abstract, while there is much truth in his position, at the same
time, both a sincere intention to heal wounds and a truly meaningful rule of law must
concretely exist for such abstract arguments to amount to anything more than special
pleading or, worse, calculated deceit.
Let me now turn to state sovereignty and national pride’s kissing cousin, equal treatment
and the associated repudiation of ‘double standards.’
B. THE CONSISTENCY AND FAIRNESS QUANDARY.
Is the transnationalization of truth-seeking and truth-articulation in any way disabled by
systemic problems (or assertions of systemic problems) of double standards, selectivity of
attention, or even hypocrisy?
In the general narrative on Sri Lanka in section IV, I noted that a panel was appointed by
the UN Secretary General to advise him on what the UN should do regarding how the
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warfare was conducted in Sri Lanka. Here is how that issue evolved at the earlier stages.
I narrate with the purpose of showing you the salience of anti-hypocrisy discourse as an
added layer to the internal/external dynamic just discussed.
As noted earlier, in early 2010, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon announced his attention
to pick up on UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay’s calls for
investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Secretary General struck
a panel to advise him on how to approach accountability questions with respect to the
final stages of the war in Sri Lanka. This generated what would appear on its surface to be
widespread support for Sri Lanka against this Secretary General initiative from the NonAligned Movement (or NAM), which consists of 118 states that, in broad terms, mostly
come from the Global South. On 9 March 2010, the coordinating bureau of NAM sent
a strongly worded letter to Ban expressing its “deep concern” especially, it argued, in light
of Sri Lanka not having been consulted and no UN organ having authoritatively called
for such an advisory panel.29 Note here that with China and Russia on the UN Security
Council, Sri Lanka has so far been protected from resolutions and even from the nonbinding but normatively salient consensus signals that take the form of “Statements of the
President of the Security Council”. In addition, Sri Lanka’s diplomacy very successfully
mobilized states to vote against any condemnatory resolution in the UN Human Rights
Council and indeed to instead vote on a resolution that applauded Sri Lanka for having
ended the war. The NAM letter also pointed to the announced intention of Sri Lanka to
appoint a commission to address accountability issues (this would become the LRRC set
up in May, mentioned earlier) and, more broadly, linked this intention later in the letter
to the “country’s ongoing and relentless efforts aimed at reinforcing reconciliation and
national unity” that needed to be given “space and time” to take their own course “without
interference or unsolicited assistance.”
For our immediate purposes, it is the double standards argument that is worth drawing
particular attention to, and that was emphasized in one way or another for a good chunk
of the NAM letter:
The Non-Aligned Movement strongly condemns the selective targeting of individual
countries, which it deems contrary to the Founding Principles of the Movement and of
the United Nations Charter. In this context, the Movement firmly opposes the unilateral
evaluation and certification of the conduct of States as a means of exerting pressure on Non
Aligned countries and other developing countries.

29 Letter from Chair of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, His Excellency Maged
A. Abdulaziz, to His Excellency UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, dated March 9, 2010, NAM Doc
106/2010 (PDF copy in possession of the author)
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There are later references in the letter to “human rights issues” needing to be addressed “in
a fair and equal manner, …with …objectivity, impartiality, non-selectivity.”
By all accounts and not surprisingly, the letter was drafted by Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to
the UN. When Ban and a number of states, such as the United Kingdom, reacted with
dismay and no small degree of anger to the NAM letter, word went out from various UN
missions of NAM states that they regretted the letter. It is not clear whether this means
that these missions had not seen or approved the NAM letter, that their capitals had not
signed off on it, or that they realized they had gone too far, or a combination of these.
In any event, Ban was not deterred, arguing that he had full powers as Secretary General
to seek advice on such matters in such a manner—and, as already noted, he went on
to appoint the three-member Panel. Sri Lanka persisted and some months later, in July
2010, another letter was circulating as a NAM draft statement, this time in advance
of the NAM annual meeting.30 Sources suggest again that this draft was 100 percent
drafted by the Sri Lankan foreign ministry. For all intents and purposes it maps onto the
March letter, while updating it by reference to the fact it was now objecting to the actual
announcement of Ban’s Panel and that the domestic commission that Sri Lanka had
promised to constitute (the LLRC) had now indeed been set up.
Very interestingly, this second July 2010 draft letter seems to have sunk without a trace,
as there is not even an oblique reference to it let alone to Sri Lanka in any statements
or texts emerging from the NAM annual meeting. Very clearly, one major reason was
geopolitical in the extreme or, viewed more benignly, it was about the power of normative
precedent even in cut-throat international affairs. By this I mean that a large number
of states, notably those also members of the Arab League and probably also the OIC /
Organization of the Islamic Conference, were concerned that Sri Lanka’s campaign—that
campaign being both against a Panel being called in its case and more broadly against
the Secretary General having such powers—would boomerang and undermine NAM
efforts to persuade Ban to appoint another UN panel to investigate what happened on
31 May 2010, with respect to Israel’s seizure of the Gaza-bound flotilla of vessels. Sri
Lanka sought to distinguish the two contexts, by arguing that on June 1 the Security
Council had authorized such a Gaza-related panel but no such authorization had
come from anywhere in the UN for a Sri Lanka panel. A critical mass of NAM states
nonetheless insisted that Sri Lanka take a back seat. Some may have been aided in their
firmness by information of important ties between Israel and Sri Lanka in the realm of
arms procurement, and perhaps in other areas of cooperation relating to the military or
security services. Some may have pointed out that Sri Lanka was wrong in law, in that
30 “Draft Statement from Non-Aligned Movement” (text as of June 30, 2010), at http://www.
thesundayleader.lk/2010/07/09/draft-statement-from-non-aligned-movement/.
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it was a consensus Statement by the President of the Security Council, not a binding
resolution, that had “called for” a panel on the Gaza-bound flotilla incident and that “call”
left it for the Secretary General create the panel within his own authority (the Presidential
Statement also noting the Secretary General had himself already called for the panel, and
implicitly endorsed his power to create the panel). But, some accounts also suggest that
there may partly be a more gratifying explanation, namely, traces of a conscience amongst
the leadership of some NAM states even when they fiercely hold onto hardening views
about state sovereignty and passionate views about non-selectivity. 141028.90
NAM’s sidelining of the second Sri Lanka letter may also have tapped into a wider
discursive context. By the time of the July 2010 NAM annual meeting, a number of
highly respected international figures had been speaking out against Sri Lanka’s handling
of the war as well as against Sri Lanka’s repressive governance and diplomatic tactics.
By this time, Desmond Tutu and Lakhdar Brahimi, both Elders, had already presaged
what would become the (earlier-mentioned) August 3 Elders statement when they wrote
an opinion editorial in the Guardian in June 2010.31 In that editorial, they had made
it known they were writing as and on behalf of The Elders as a whole. Consistent with
this narrative, some accounts of what transpired within NAM around the July 2010 Sri
Lanka draft letter make clear that more than one state told Sri Lanka that its conduct
and attitude was putting it perilously close to the category of being a rogue state in the
international system.
At this point, we can see the beginnings of a more nuanced ‘kindler and gentler’ Sri
Lanka discourse (i.e. from mid to late summer 2010), including what seems to have
been a good will tour of Foreign Minister Peiris through many important centres,
from Beijing to New York to Delhi and now today London. During his China visit,
Peiris made empathy-laced remarks about the Sri Lanka government’s sentiments and
intentions that would take Sri Lanka a long way were they to prove to be more than mere
words of a Foreign Minister in a foreign capital and to also actually match up with the
institutional and political realities of the Sri Lanka government. This discourse includes
also Rajapaksa’s September 2010 speech to the UN in which he both calls obliquely for
the laws of war to be adjusted and says, in a now oft-referenced line, “Let me be clear, no
nation on earth can wish Sri Lanka’s Tamil community more good fortune than Sri Lanka
itself.”
But none of this gainsays that the argument based on a concern about double standards
has somehow disappeared simply because it was not repeated in July 2010 NAM
statements—even as it may show that double standards discourse does have its limits.
31 Desmond Tutu and Lakhdar Brahimi, “Sri Lanka, one year on from war”, The Guardian, May 18, 2010,
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/18/sri-lanka-lasting-peace.
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The relative ease with which a double-standards objection was made a pillar of the
March 2010 NAM letter to Secretary General Ban speaks for itself about the salience
of this argument. The question, for present purposes, is how might we think about the
objection’s significance.
First let me give two other relevant examples from the realm of transnational truth and
justice in order to take matters away a bit from the more emotive context of Sri Lanka, in
which many may have trouble trusting many arguments from Sri Lanka’s government, in
light of decades of experience with truth-telling from Colombo, and may tend wrongly to
suppose that all arguments stemming from Colombo are not to be trusted.
Consider the post-9/11 (and some pre-9/11) conduct of the United States, both during
the George W Bush era and since President Obama has taken office. Consider the
position of the United States in relation to the slow dribbling out of information—much
rising to the level of widely presumed truth—about methods used and decisions taken
as part of the United States’ approach to the so-called ‘global war on terror’: deliberate
extraordinary renditions to partner intelligence services, such as Syria or Egypt, who will
torture renditioned persons and flip any information back to the US; authorization of a
range of methods of so-called enhanced interrogation that included some free-standing
practices that are clearly torture—such as the water-boarding that pre-Vietnam America
learned from the French’s widespread use of it in Algeria—and included many ways in
which a combination of such methods also clearly constituted torture; ‘ghost planes’ crisscrossing the globe and not only doing the transfer side of renditions but also delivering
prisoners to “black hole” detention facilities in countries like Uzbekistan; Abu Ghraib;
Guántanamo; going to war in Iraq partly on the basis of known poor-quality intelligence,
knowingly contrived linkages between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, lies
about al-Qaeda and Iraq cooperating, no UN authorization in a context when trained
UN teams were reporting no evidence of WMD in Iraq, and no serious regard for
the fact international law clearly prohibits preventive use of force of the kind at issue;
high levels of civilian casualties from conventional warfare at different periods in both
Afghanistan and Iraq; the ease with which the US—including President Obama even
more enthusiastically than President Bush—has embraced targeted killings around the
globe as a counter-terrorist tactic in contexts in which the only plausible legal argument is
either that host states have given valid consent (when many have not done so publicly, e.g.
Pakistan) or that the laws of war have already changed to bring counter-terrorism firmly
into a transnational war paradigm and further and further away from the criminal law
enforcement paradigm.
Have I missed anything? I am sure I have, but this list of examples of problematic
conduct by the US is sufficient for present purposes. An important caveat should be
lodged before I continue to discuss the relevance of these examples to the double-
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standards issue, namely, that I do not wish to be understood as saying that all of these rise
to the level of what the Sri Lankan military or government are accused of doing over the
years, including in what Tutu and Brahimi call the “slaughter” of the last days of the war.
But nor are there easy categorical distinctions in the case of many of the examples given.
And, most centrally, the overriding commonality is that, when pushed by terrorism, the
US got very ugly and remains quite ugly in its methods. It may have got much uglier
if various aspects of the rule of law were not in place—here I include the inculcation
of due process and sound legal analysis as a value system for military lawyers in a way
it tends not to be the case in the CIA or amongst parachuted ideological lawyers in the
Bush-era Departments of Defence, Justice and State—and if the US’ media and political
democracy were less robust than they are.
Thus it is that one then turns to the following question: where have justice and truth been
in relation to US practices? Can anyone tell me when the Rumsfeld or Cheney or Bush
trial—or trials—will take place? We do not know whether the Department of Justice
in the US will eventually acquire a combination of both principle and backbone, but I
would not hold my breath. We do not know whether higher courts will overturn a lower
court decision that accepts the arguments of the Obama Administration that civil suits by
detainees cannot go ahead because of some sweeping doctrine of state secrets, but I would
not hold your breath too much there either. Especially not in a US where President
Obama places such emphasis on bridge-building—‘one America not a Red America nor
a Blue America’—and on a forward-looking ethos that has quite precise parallels in the
look-to-the-future-not-the-past discourse of President Rajapaksa. Especially in a US where
the very idea of a truth commission, let alone one recommended (forget imposed) by the
UN, would bring the Tea Party into the White House. Especially not when President
Obama has indicated at one point that reconciliation was his concern with respect to the
conduct of the previous administration, by which he clearly means reconciliation within
the US: he apparently sees no moral problem prioritizing reconciliation over truth or
justice when the context of harm is in no way a self-contained one of Americans-againstAmercans but rather is as transnational as one can possibly get—the primary victims
of US counter-terrorism policy being non-Americans and the large percentage of harm
occurring outside the US.
But there is no UN Panel of Experts to advise the Secretary General on how to deal with
the United States’ conduct of the ‘global war on terror.’ And there is no Lessons Learned
and Reconciliation Commission in the US.
Let me now turn to a second example, that of seeking transnational justice through the
route of universalized jurisdiction in another country’s criminal justice system. Let us
take the highest profile example for the past decade, that of Spain (even as, I hasten to
add, some other countries, like Belgium, have at different points had broader laws and
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arguably more effective efforts to prosecute). Amongst the numerous cases of alleged
crimes being investigated by the Audiencia Nacional (National Court) from around the
world (which may include Sri Lanka now, but of this I am not aware), one case involved
Americans being investigated, notably six lawyers where the issue is whether their legal
advice was so poor or manipulated that they were complicit in the conduct they helped
authorize. (Recent Wikileaked cables have caused some stir in Spain because of the
pattern of meetings between the US Embassy and some members of Spain’s investigating
apparatus, and the clear pressure the US placed on Spain to see any actual prosecutions as
disastrous for US-Spain relations.)
Now, let me play the devil’s advocate from, say, Lincoln, Nebraska, USA.
Did you (Spain) not have a murderous civil war with vicious war crimes that led to no
trials of members of the victorious side? When Franco died, did you not agree to an
amnesty law extending back through the Franco dictatorship to the Civil War, which
amnesty law you take so seriously that your national Judicial Council suspended one
of your investigating magistrates (Judge Baltasar Garzón) for having proceeded with
investigations into mass gravesites on a theory (that he sought to ground in international
law as received by Spanish law) that the amnesty could not cover certain categories of
crimes under international law after the Supreme Court ruled that a criminal law charge
of prevaricacón could go ahead against Garzón for intentional abuse of the law for having
pursued this line of argument? And now you seek to try our citizens (our military officers,
our politicians, Heaven forbid our lawyers), you seek to try our citizens based on a
universal jurisdiction that does not apply to yourselves?
Spain’s parliament cut back on the scope of its already qualified universal criminal law
jurisdiction in late 2009 (although not nearly as far as some suppose) precisely because
not only were countries—notably the US, China and Israel—pressuring it about sheer
encroachment on their sovereignty but also, we must assume, because Spain in the
form of its foreign service was being worn down over a decade of dozens of cases being
investigated, indictments laid, and extradition requests issued by the sheer hypocrisy of
Spain’s position—or at least foreign perceptions of such hypocrisy. Indeed, I cannot of
course prove, and I am only speculating, but I would not be surprised if it turned out
that Judge Garzón, the instructing judge most associated with Spain’s judicial efforts,
especially felt the force of the perceived double standard—on this dimension, he was
Spain—that there may have come a point when he decided that, as an ethical and almost
existential matter, he had to turn his sights inward on Spain’s own record on the war
crimes and crimes against humanity front. All of this is a way of saying that charges of
hypocrisy can take their toll and prompt changes in conduct.
Having outlined two examples of hypocrisy (the US and Spain), let me now turn to a
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very clear instance of Sri Lanka’s responses to external criticism and pressure, along antihypocrisy lines. What makes it especially interesting is how it references the West in
general—and thus the record of Western states—but in the context of rejecting criticisms
made not by states but particularly by major global NGOs. In late May or early June (the
report on the Sri Lanka government website is dated June 1, 2010) in Washington DC,32
Foreign Minister Peiris is quoted as reacting strongly in the context of an open forum or
a press conference to a question, characterized as a demand, by someone from Amnesty
International:
When the sustained questions continued and an Amnesty International representative
called for an independent, international body, alleging that the credibility of various
government appointed human rights and investigative commissions were suspect, Peiris
shot back, "Don't forget that only one year has elapsed since the end of the war."
"Look at the experience of other countries in similar situations. How long have they
taken? I won't mention countries (but) some of them have taken 30 years. So, why are
you applying double standards? Why isn't Amnesty International in a mood to apply these
same standards universally? Why single out Sri Lanka. Is it because Sri Lanka is a poor
country, Sri Lanka can be pushed around--kicked around like a football? Certainly not! We
won't allow that by Amnesty International or anybody else."
Peiris said, "If you believe in a set of values, at the very least, apply those values across the
board. Do not be selective. Do not be discriminatory," and continuing to pillory Amnesty
International and the other human rights groups, asked, "Are those values applied with
any iota of consistency. What about the performance of other countries in comparable
situations? I think we have done a great deal within a very short period."
Peiris reiterated, "We don't want Amnesty International telling us what to do. We will
take it from the Security Council, (but) we will certainly not take it from Amnesty
International. What is the moral authority of Amnesty International? We will read the
International Crisis Group and Amnesty International's reports, we will listen to them. But
we do not think that they have any coercive moral authority to tell us what to do."33

On the same morning of the present lecture, Foreign Minister Peiris gave an eloquent
and sharply argued keynote speech just down the road at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London, at a session I attended. There was a considerable amount

32 For further commentary on Foreign Minister Peiris’ May 2010 visit to Washington D.C., see Craig Scott,
“Taking Tea with Torturers” (January 31, 2011). OpenDemocracy, January 2011. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1752889.
33 “Amnesty International can't dictate terms to us, says Lankan minister,” Rediff News (June 1, 2010),
at http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/may/27/amnesty-international-cant-dictate-terms-to-us-lankanminister-peiris.htm

The transnationalization of truth: A meditation on Sri Lanka and Honduras

79

that he said that was constructive and persuasive, but he also did indeed take a similar
attack-tack when faced with a question from a London-based Amnesty International
representative. He characterized Amnesty’s criticisms as “almost colonial, patronizing
and condescending” (all quotations are from my own notes of the exchange). Amnesty
is “not objective, not dispassionate.” Amnesty has a “political objective” in its criticisms
of Sri Lanka. In specific response to the question from the Amnesty representative about
the state of progress of a Witness Protection Bill in Sri Lanka’s Parliament, Peiris said “we
are not going to accept a model you dictate.” Finally, when an elderly gentleman asked
a leading question from the floor, Peiris partly agreed with its thrust by referring to a
“mercenary incentive” for NGOs to claim there are problems or to work from negative
presumptions about government conduct or intentions, because it keeps them in a job as
it were, “a way of life, very comfortable.”
Is all this political hot air that leverages normativity when it is convenient to do so, but
otherwise of no special import? I don’t think so, or at least, it is certainly not entirely so.
First, let me get out of the way one of the uses of fairness and consistency arguments.
Even assuming a given contrast is fully on point and not one of the cruder efforts to
compare (in other words, assume that relevantly like cases are not being treated alike
within the same system), it does not follow that a norm ceases to apply to one actor
because it has not also been applied to another. Most moral or legal philosophers treat
this as a no-brainer, essentially a variant of “two wrongs do not make a right” (or, perhaps
more accurately, “being second to commit a wrong does not turn that wrong into a
right”). You can’t convert a wrong into a right because others have gotten away with the
same wrong. If that is what Foreign Minister Peiris is trying to do, then it does not fly as
a serious argument.
But what if one widens the aperture of our lens? On the ethical side, a notion arises that
any actor that is itself guilty of inconsistently applying the norm—either not applying
it, for example, to their friends or, in a situation of pure hypocrisy, advocating it but
not applying it to oneself—should, from an ethical point of view, be precluded (or, to
use a legal metaphor, stopped) from taking the institutionalized action it seeks to take.
Perhaps such preclusion even extends, in a world of very prickly sovereign sensitivities as
embodied by Foreign Minister Peiris, to a disentitlement to even state one’s understanding
of the truth through verbal criticism. Could this be in effect what Foreign Minister
Peiris is saying? I think it may well be. But, if so, that does not mean he is correct in
his premises, especially regarding an NGO like Amnesty International that has forged
its reputation over the decades on scrupulous attention to accurate facts and consistent
application of its mandate worldwide. One would have to show that in their worldwide
remit, AI, or other criticized NGOs, do not take all governments—and indeed relevant
non-state actors (such as the LTTE)—to task on the basis of the same applicable norms.
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Showing such inconsistency and unfairness of attention is not something that Foreign
Minister Peiris can easily do, in my view. (I will leave aside, for attention at some future
date, my view that it is not persuasive to equate verbal criticism—especially when that
criticism comes from non-state, civil-society quarters—with the kind of more coercive
conduct that kicks in with more institutionalized conduct. For reasons related to a certain
power to be selective within free expression, I do not see such selectivity as presenting the
same ethical challenges as when institutional action is carried out hypocritically.)
But there is an even wider setting for that lens aperture that might also be what Foreign
Minister Peiris is partly concerned with. That is the perspective on the legitimacy—not
the strict legality, but the legitimacy—of the system as a whole. To the extent that a
system operates in such a way that axes of criticism and calls for institutionalized coercion
in the name of the system strongly tend to go in some directions while not in others, then
we can speak of a problematic system-wide imbalance that undermines its legitimacy. I
will avoid, here and at this time, going into the legal philosophical discussion of whether
such systemic illegitimacy ever circles back to render the system’s norms illegal or renders
coercion on the basis of those norms illegal. For present purposes, I content myself
with observing that the systemic perspective at the very least adds fuel to the fire of the
ethical concerns about pressuring one set of actors to account while leaving others only
occasionally touched or, worse, untouchable.
Without getting into, let alone resolving, several other more theoretical questions that
could well be asked, I will simply state my general view that double standards, selectivity,
inconsistency, and hypocrisy—all notions that get at similar if not fully identical
concerns—are valid concerns not only for the interstate legal system but also for the
more fluid universe of transnationalized interventions in the name of law. And, beyond
these being real normative concerns, it is significant from a purely practical point of
view that national audiences can quite easily be motivated to rally around a selectivity
critique made against external actors by their own government, especially in contexts in
which the audiences already feel victimized, ganged up upon, misunderstood, isolated,
and so on. This is so even if the contrasts being drawn by the government are crude (e.g.
were Mauritania to tell the US to back off of criticisms with respect to slavery practices
by pointing out the US had slavery until the US Civil War, or were Honduras to tell
Canada to back off criticizing the lack of state protection for the many transsexuals
killed in that country by pointing to press reports that gay-bashing attacks occasionally
occur in Canada34) or even if, let us assume, the contrasts are simply mistaken about

34 Compare to less crude comparisons, which would require more fine-grained discussion of how apt the
comparison is as a basis for an anti-hypocrisy pushback: e.g. were a country to have ineffective state
protection for social practices of racial discrimination that bear striking similarity to practices within
the US well into recent times, or were Honduras to point to accurate information about the failure
of authorities in Canada to prevent, and then to adequately investigate, a steady stream of killings of
prostitutes (or presumed prostitutes) in Vancouver over the years.
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relevant comparators. An example of such a mistake is when Sri Lanka asserts that a
major difference between the Secretary General striking panels in relation to Gaza and
in relation to Sri Lanka is that the Security Council authorized one but not the other—
which is simply a misreading of what the Security Council did, as explained earlier. But,
notwithstanding being mistaken, consistency arguments can, in the real world, persuade
the wider populace even if those arguments conveniently ignore relevant differences (as
in, the Secretary General’s Gaza panel is an investigatory panel that is to probe and issue
a report on its view of the facts and legality of the flotilla seizures while the Sri Lanka
panel is only to give advice on what processes, if any, to initiate in future). In all these illfounded instances, the critique can still find a receptive ground ‘back home’.
One way or the other, it seems to me—and here I am combining the discussion in each
of these quandaries (the inside/outside one and the double standards one)—that truth
transnationalizers have some sort of obligation to consider perceptions that their role is
one or more of three things: external, imposed, and/or selective. When all three are in
play, then the implications are all the more in need of serious reflection. In general, those
establishing transnationalized truth processes or institutions, or those operating within
already established ones, need to have regard to the following three approaches, strategies
or modes of conduct:
First, such actors—truth transnationalizing actors—should associate themselves, and act
in accordance, with the values and principles related to non-selectivity and consistency
of treatment. Sometimes this will be more difficult where mandates and resources place
constraints on what can be done, but, even then, it places some sort of obligation to seek
changes to the mandate or to more effectively marshal resources to eliminate unjustifiably
selective treatment. This mode of conduct has both a substantive-jurisdictional and a
spatial-jurisdictional face. Here, by a substantive-jurisdictional focus, I mean the thematic
focus circumscribed by a mandate, holding constant the geographical scope—so, if the
focus is Sri Lanka and the issue is wartime conduct, it is unacceptable to focus only on
the government and not also on the LTTE. Extending the example, if the focus is on
the many dimensions of the breakdown of the rule of law in Sri Lanka, it is important to
also consider the nature of the LTTE when it was a de facto localized (undemocratic and
repressive) government in areas of northern Sri Lanka and in terms of what it would have
been like had it become the government of a new state of Tamil Eelam. It is important
to do this for a number of reasons that include the need to strike at certain myths such
as the myth that abuse of human rights and undervaluing of democracy is somehow a
Sinhalese attribute or that Sinhalese-dominated national-government repression explains
the conduct of either LTTE leader Prabakaran and his officials, or the LTTE as a whole.35

35 On this score, a member of the Tamil diaspora wrote in a Sri Lanka Campaign LC blog post a few
months ago: “There have been such myths in Sri Lanka on all sides. Tamils have had the myth that
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In further respect to the aforementioned opinion editorial by Desmond Tutu and Lakhdar
Brahimi, they put it well and succinctly when they wrote in the Guardian last June about
“obligations on the Tamil community within and outside Sri Lanka” and argued that “they
also have to find the courage to admit the crimes of the LTTE committed in their name”,
which will “help provide the platform for honest negotiation between the government
and credible, independent representatives of Tamils and Muslims.” I would go further
and say that, from a transnationalized perspective on truth, the bright lines of a border
on a map should not dictate the chain of causation and responsibility that is relevant
to knowing a reasonably fulsome truth. Depending on the transnational context, and
depending on the mandate, the conduct of external actors and their related responsibility
may well need to be brought into the picture, whether that means arms and intelligence
suppliers of the government of Sri Lanka or organizations in the diaspora when it comes
to the LTTE side of things.36
Consistency of a spatial-jurisdictional sort applies especially to international institutions
like the UN and also to non-governmental organizations that have a general mandate
for the world or a whole region. I mean here that such organizations have some sort of
obligation to make connections across geographically-identified situations, and rectify any
differences in treatment of some situations that are not materially different in the nature
of the issues or in the levels of seriousness than other situations receiving critical attention.
This does not mean accepting to be browbeaten into backing off from one situation
because one has not yet moved on to another (think of this as a sequencing issue)—that
one cannot do what is right everywhere does not mean not doing right somewhere, where
the circumstances lead one to a reasonable judgment that this “somewhere” needs to be
made a priority. But, yet, it does mean not simply relying on such circumstances lazily
or without concern for why comparable situations do not seem yet to be on the radar
screen. Here, my assumption is that the record of NGOs like Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group is far better than any state
or any interstate forum where a combination of interest-based politics or diplomatic
compromise drives the agenda. The UN Human Rights Council is an obvious example of
an institution not well positioned to act consistently except where it delegates functions
to arm’s length mechanisms such as the theme-based special rapporteurs who are (meant
to be) independent experts and whose mandate requires holding all states up to scrutiny
for adherence to the same norms.

the authoritarianism and brutality of the LTTE was a sad but unavoidable consequence of Sinhalese
oppression. Sinhalese have had the myth that colonial rulers are responsible.. [and so on].”
36 Recall, by way of comparison, that the mandate of the civil-society Comisión de Verdad in Honduras
includes looking at the roles and responsibilities of external actors in relation to the coup and human
rights violations.
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Secondly, truth transnationalizing actors should self-consciously pay attention to the
normative bases for the assumed legitimacy of their interventions—in an effort to
persuade, as and when the need arises, all relevant national sectors (and indeed persuade
themselves) that their normative involvement is justified. This must of course include
rigorous and well-grounded appeals to relevant global and/or regional norms, and careful
attention to factual nuances that may raise serious issues of limitations on or exceptions
to rights. In some cases, it means achieving an informed level of confidence that the
research, findings and analysis of other bodies, upon which one is relying in some
measure, merit being treated as authoritative for a given purpose. For example, when a
co-author and I were preparing the overview paper called “The Breakdown of the Rule
of Law in Sri Lanka: An Overview” for the Sri Lanka Campaign, we took care to make
careful judgments about which organizations had, in our view, a record of producing
accurate and fair work and then making sure that their Sri Lanka-relevant work was relied
upon corroboratively and not as the sole basis for a specific conclusion about an aspect
of the rule-of-law situation. Standard stuff, you will be thinking, and, yes, that is true.
However, for an advocacy-oriented organization like Sri Lanka Campaign, where the
general argument we felt needed to be made (i.e. the situation of “abysmal lawlessness”
in SL) was so strong, it was all the more important to test that argument against a range
of solid sources. This is not to say the document itself is even-handed. As one of the
authors, I am aware of some of its limitations. For example, apart from slipping into
perhaps an unduly polemical tone in several places (perhaps as a subconscious reaction
to the hyperbolic tone often adopted by the Sri Lankan government), it does have as one
limitation a focus solely on the failure of government institutions and associated rule
of law—including over the period when the LTTE was running its own government
institutions in insurgent-held areas. The reason for such focus is that the question of the
rule of law was being addressed not as a historical matter but in relation to the practices
of the sole government ruling, since the end of the war in 2009, all of Sri Lanka. At the
same time, and returning to the first approach canvassed above, discussion is now going
on within the Sri Lanka Campaign about whether we have the resources to produce a
similar synthesis-style report about the nature of LTTE governance and conduct, which
report would be conducive to a wider truth and to our overarching objectives of a
sustainable peace through, and with, justice. And some discussion is also underway over
how to report and evaluate the positive developments that the Sri Lankan government
understandably wishes to emphasize (albeit in ways that do not always seem fully
accurate and that almost always denies that there are serious problems worthy of external
attention).
Thirdly, justifying one’s involvement as a transnationalized actor also can, and should,
be connected to the nature of a situation in terms of the ways and extent to which the
situation is already transnationalized, often thoroughly so. This could mean a range of
things with respect to why such actors not only are justified in getting involved—for
example and perhaps notably, because of some sort of transnationalized interest in a
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problem (international law’s characterization of some norms as creating obligations
running from all states to all states, and so on)—but also why their involvement may
well enhance the quality of the process in a way that the presence of only domestic
actors cannot. This last point generates too many obvious examples to go into further,
but I would say that the broader idea of transnationalization as a process enhancer does
need more theoretical and analytical attention, which I hope to give in future work. The
specific contexts of Honduras and Sri Lanka also suggest another important dimension.
In these cases, I believe a good argument can be made not only that transnationalization
is legitimate but also that the situation in each country may indeed merit a certain
priority of (transnationalized) attention precisely because of the world-historical or
region-historical significance of what went on and is going on in each context. In this
respect, recall the earlier moral-hazards, demonstrator-effects discussion.
Fourthly, while this argument is quite suggestive at present without showing all the
steps in the argument, a further consequence of simultaneously taking inside/outside
and consistency/fairness dynamics seriously may well be that institutional hybridization
should perhaps hold a special appeal for us. Transcending of internal/external lines could
also extend to the blurring of official/unofficial lines. In speaking of hybrids, I am both
including the idea of institutions that are themselves hybrid—in terms of composition
and process, for example—and also looking at a situation from a wider angle so as
to treat different institutions and processes in terms of a virtual whole within which
hybridization occurs largely through interaction across institutional boundaries which in
turn may entail interaction across governance-jurisdictional borders. Allow me to use this
as the opportunity to give an example of transnational inter-institutional hybridization,
which may be an example that the Secretary General’s advisory panel on Sri Lanka will
look seriously at as a possible model—with all appropriate adjustments for context and
institutional realities, with account taken of a widespread view of observers that this
hybrid has not as yet succeeded, and subject to what I will say at the end of the lecture on
the timing and staging of truth in relation to justice or reconciliation.
The model is that of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala
(CICIG as the Spanish acronym), which was established four years ago in 2006 by
a treaty between Guatemala and the UN. Note that this is a specifically criminaljustice oriented institution, and not a truth commission (Guatemala has had two truth
commissions in the last fifteen years, one an official one and one a civil-society one),
although of course there is a truth-generating core to any criminal justice process. What
is it and how is it a transnationalized hybrid? I will by and large rely on the CICIG’s own
self-description of its mandate and functions, as my own research into it—and notably its
effectiveness—has only recently begun. 37
37 The Official website of CICIG is http://www.cicig.org/. The following article does a good job describing
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CICIG is an independent body with the mandate to support the Public Prosecutors
Office, the National Civilian Police and other Guatemalan state institutions in the
investigation of a limited number of sensitive and difficult cases in relation to the
operations of illegal security groups and clandestine security organizations, with the
purpose of dismantling such groups. A second reason it is in place—and has had
its mandate extended to 2011—was the hope that CICIG's work would assist in
strengthening the capacity of national judicial sector institutions, including prosecution
and police institutions, to deal with illegal groups and organized crime in the future.
CICIG has the authority to lead investigations into the existence of the groups, in all their
dimensions including links between state officials and organized crime and their sources
of financing. The lead responsibility for investigation and prosecution of individuals
within the groups rests with Guatemalan institutions, principally the Attorney General,
but CICIG is accorded an assistance role. Within the prosecution process, CICIG is able
to tap into the existing Guatemalan Code of Criminal Procedure and participate as what
is known as a “complementary prosecutor” (querellante adhesivo) in the prosecutorial
process—a role I do not yet fully understand. The Commission also has legal standing to
bring administrative complaints against public officials, in particular when officials have
sought to obstruct the fulfillment of CICIG's mandate, and it can also act as an interested
third party in disciplinary procedures initiated against such officials. Finally, it has a
system-reform, public-policy role in that it is authorized to make recommendations to
the Government for law reform—including mechanisms and procedures—both directed
at the eradication of these groups and the strengthening of the state's capacity to protect
basic human rights.
The immediate reason that the CICIG comes to mind is that both Honduran President
Lobo and the Chair of the official CVR, Eduardo Stein, started musing out loud in late
summer 2010—in a trial balloon kind of way—about whether this CICIG model might
not be worthy of consideration for Honduras as well. (It is not entirely clear whether
Stein was trial-ballooning as much as he may have been responding to media queries
as a result of balloons set aloft by President Lobo.) In any event, my purpose is to draw
attention to it as an example of transnational inter-institutional hybridization but not,
in the present context, to assess the pros and cons of the CICIG model. I would note,
though, that I believe the civil-society CV should also look very carefully at how it
appears to have functioned in practice and on its upsides and downsides in relation to
other institutional options.

the formal structure of CICIP, but it should not be relied upon as a study of how CICIP has actually
functioned: Andrew Hudson and Alexandra Taylor, “The International Commission against Impunity
in Guatemala: A New Model for International Criminal Justice Mechanisms”, (2010) 8 Journal of
International Criminal Justice 8 (2010), 53-74.
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Without prejudicing such reflection on the relevance or non-relevance of CICIG for the
Honduran situation, it is instructive to consider some of the comments that Eduardo
Stein has made this past September in what I have called a trial-balloon mode. These
quotations are from September, and appear to be long transcripts of comments by Stein,
reproduced by one or more newspapers. These are my rough translations from transcripts
in Spanish on the CVR website:
One way of looking at it is that creating CICIG is like hiring a foreign manager to try to
improve the firepower of the national football team.
The agreement [between Guatemala and the UN] is not for purposes of substitution [of
an international body for national ones]. That would be fatal. On the contrary, it is an
agreement for institutional strengthening, that is to say, the UN is invited to create an
International Commission composed of highly skilled experts in the prosecution of crime
in order to put together criminal cases that can be brought before the Guatemalan justice
system. But this Commission does not replace the Attorney General nor the courts.

I return now to some of the thoughts outlined in section II, on truth and interactive
diversity of knowledge. Hybridization can have the major benefit of helping generate a
certain kind of engagement that may shake participants out of comfort zones by exposing
them to different perspectives—whether institutionalized perspectives or more general
worldviews or backgrounds—and by placing pressure on a process to embrace some form
of a dialogical rationality as opposed to the more monological rationality that arises when
participants share too closely backgrounds, professions, cultural narratives, nationalities
and so on. Apart from such a focus on cooperative intra- or inter-institutional relations,
we should also not forget the age-old insight that diversity of perspective within a larger
whole is also justified by ‘checks and balances’ and ‘jurisdictional competition’ kinds of
benefits.
To take the recent example of the Turkel Commission set up by Israel to investigate
itself with respect to the 31 May 2010 Gaza-flotilla incident, it was set up to include
two respected international observers who are entitled to be full participants in the
Commission’s deliberation process although without the right to vote. On the one hand,
I would be surprised if these non-Israelis’ points of view did not enter into the persuasive
mix in the minds of the Israeli members, especially given the special expertise in the
laws of war that the Canadian member, the former Judge Advocate General, Brigadier
General Ken Watkin, will bring to the table and the experience of Lord David Trimble,
former First Minister of Northern Ireland, the line between the legal and the extra-legal
in security situations. On the other hand, I can only imagine how difficult it would be
for any commission to produce a whitewash—not that I am not assuming these Israeli
commissioners are at all inclined to, as I know nothing about them—given that the nonIsraelis will surely act as some sort of external conscience. Put differently, the presence
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of Trimble and indeed of Watkin gives me reasonable confidence that the report of the
Commission will be fairer to the law than it might otherwise end up being—although
fairness does not of course preclude that the Commission will arrive at interpretations of
the facts and the law with which I may strongly disagree.38
Without saying more than I should, I might also note parenthetically that I am inclined
to think about the relationship between the CVR and the CV (which at the moment
is an entirely virtual one as the commissions have not met) in terms of keeping each
other honest. I do not mean ‘honest’ in the literal sense but in the more figurative sense,
according to which the presence of another institution with complementary and to some
extent overlapping mandates keeps an institution on its toes in the sense that a markedly
superior performance from the other institution—for example, in the form of a more
persuasive report—will ‘show up’ one’s own institution. The result will, I hope, be a
fuller truth, including as may be produced by discussion and debate about any differences
in findings, interpretations, recommendations or emphasis between the two reports.
In the most simplified sense, as I have said more than once to the media in Canada or
Honduras, “more truth is better than less.” In a more complex sense, though, it is my
expectation that it will not only be a matter of quantity (more truth)–although that will
certainly be the case on the pure factual findings side of things—as a quality thing (deeper
truth): the presence of the CVR and the CV means the quality of what each produces
should be higher than if the other did not exist as its shadow.
C. THE TIMING QUANDARY
Partly in light of the inside/outside quandary and the fairness quandary, how should
processes related to truth be timed or staged in relation to processes related to justice and
reconciliation?
Allow me to set up this discussion by returning again to Eduardo Stein. One way or
the other, the preceding discussions emphasized issues of imposition (and perceptions
thereof ). In reflecting on the CICIG model from Guatemala, Stein was making clear
that he is not thinking a straightforward transplant makes sense. This follows from the
emphasis he placed on the need to take great care with national dignity in crafting the
design, the time it takes to do so, and the fact that the final outcome will reflect a variety
of inputs over that time. Here is how he put the matter (this again being my provisional
rough translation):
38 See Craig Scott, “Israel’s Seizure of the Gaza-Bound Flotilla: Applicable Laws and Legality” (October
19, 2010). Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 42/2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1694682 for some discussion of the several institutional processes looking at the Gaza-bound
flotilla incident. The Turkel Commission has now reported, but I have not had a chance to read the
report as of the time of writing of the present article.
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How does one avoid a commission of this nature being perceived as a loss of what was the
country’s own capacity to govern?
The decision in my country [Guatemala] about this impunity commission [CICIG] lasted
almost four years, during which the debate was very wide, very diverse, at some moments
difficult, but at least citizens could know the different opinions directly from their deputies
in Congress, from the Court of Justice, from the Attorney General, and from the upper
chambers of the tribunals.
Doing something like this in a hurry without citizens understanding the reasons for doing
so, that is politically risky, but it also risks a round of infighting within the State, that also
is not healthy for democracy.

In the course of discussions amongst some of us involved in the Sri Lanka Campaign,
reflection on how to think about truth in relation to either or both reconciliation and
justice has become central in considering what would be the desirable outcomes of the
current UN Panel established by Ban Ki-moon to advise him on ways forward for Sri
Lanka. Here, note two constraining conditions about that panel’s work. One condition
is that the Secretary-General and thus this Panel is only concerned about the question
of the conduct at the end of the war, and possibly also concerned about internment,
detention and resettlement issues that may themselves be partly governed by the laws of
war/international humanitarian law. This Panel is not there to deal as such with other
wrongs in the past, let alone with the current state of affairs in Sri Lanka. The second
constraining condition is precisely the reasonably held view that the very situation of the
highly compromised rule of law in Sri Lanka determines the extent to which anything
serious or robust can emerge from Sri Lanka’s own political institutions—or politically
created such as the LLRC–at this time.
This has consequences for the justifiability, from the perspective of need, of an
international body or of a transnationalized hybrid body such as a CICIG. Recall Louise
Arbour’s reasoning, which was essentially that the international system is the necessary
fallback because Sri Lanka has shown persistently for years that it will not engage in
serious scrutiny of its own officials. The preference expressed in June 2010 by the two
Elders, Bishop Desmond Tutu and former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi,
in their already-noted Guardian article, seems to follow a similar logic, although their
institutional recommendation adds a dimension (reconciliation) not specifically addressed
by Arbour. They stated their view as follows:
There is a growing body of evidence that there were repeated and intentional violations of
international humanitarian law by both the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) in the last months of the war.
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President Mahinda Rajapaksa's decision earlier this month to appoint a commission on
lessons learnt and reconciliation is a step in the right direction but not nearly enough.
There is no indication, as yet, that the commission intends to hold anyone to account for
any violations of domestic or international law.
Without a clear mandate for legal accountability, the commission has little chance of
producing either truth or reconciliation. Nor will victims and witnesses feel safe in giving
evidence.
The Elders believe an independent, international inquiry, with the ability to gather
evidence within the country, is the best option. We hope this will be the recommendation
of the expert panel due to be set up to advise the UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon.
If so, Sri Lanka's friends should then press the government to accept such an inquiry. In
our experience in South Africa and other countries, these kinds of inquiries work best
alongside a full and open reconciliation process. This would allow the suffering—and
mistakes—of all communities during decades of war to be acknowledged.

How to think about this proposal from these two eminent Elders? I suggest that we
approach their proposal starting from the premise that (a) contextualization and (b)
staging/timing issues need to be considered together when it comes to "reconciliation."
One of the legacies of 70+ processes in various countries over the years—and perhaps
mostly due to South Africa as a foremost example—is that we sometimes may tend to
assume "truth and reconciliation" are like bonded atoms in a compound that necessarily
has something essential to do with both peace and justice. Part of this assumption is that
they (truth-seeking processes and reconciliation-seeking processes) should take place coterminously in transitional or post-conflict situations. Note how the Tutu/Brahimi view
does advocate a co-terminous treatment of truth and reconciliation, albeit with the very
important nuance of an institutional separation with truth-generation having a central
international institutional dimension while institutional processes directed towards
reconciliation would be national. Even as their proposal for a form of inter-jurisdictional
hybridity creates a separation of truth and reconciliation, the issue to be discussed is the
fact that they still do occur coterminously on the Tutu/Brahimi proposal. However, there
are good reasons to reflect longer and harder on this simultaneity.
Let me make some brief general remarks on contextualization as part of thinking about
timing and in particular about the simultaneity assumption. We must think hard about
how—in a given context within a given geopolitical environment and within a given
regional or global normative environment—processes related to truth and reconciliation
should be sequenced if meaningful and sustainable justice and reconciliation are to
be given a chance. South Africa is not Peru is not Cambodia and neither of them is
Honduras or Sri Lanka. That said, with respect to two factors, there is a similarity
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between the situation of Honduras and Sri Lanka, whatever their many differences. First,
justice and, perhaps especially meaningful reconciliation, are very hard to achieve in the
face of the reluctance and resistance of current political power-holders who include in
their ranks some—if not many or most—of the persons whose individual responsibility
would be under scrutiny in any justice process. A Wikileaked cable from the US Embassy
in Colombo made exactly that point. Ambassador Butenis cabled Washington on 15
July 15 2010 with the following observation: “There are no examples we know of a
regime undertaking wholesale investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war
crimes while that regime or government remained in power. In Sri Lanka this is further
complicated by the fact that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the
country’s senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his
brothers and opposition candidate General Fonseka.”39
Second, the lack of a passage of time—the fact of being in the raw early stages of a
transition—also speaks against meaningful reconciliation and justice efforts. We need
only recall the post-Liberation period in France at the end of the Second World War
and be grateful that Sri Lanka has not followed the French example. In the 1944-1958
period (but primarily 1944-1949), a combined cleansing and vengeance process that
became known as L’Épuration took place. L’Épuration saw, on some accounts, some 3000
execution sentences handed down against French collaborators from courts specially
created by General de Gaulle’s transitional regime, with something like 1200-1500 of
these death sentences actually carried out. This is apart from the wholesale and often
rabid street justice that French citizens were permitted to mete out upon each other,
which almost certainly saw killings in the tens of thousands of those deemed to have
collaborated (as well as those killed either in personal settling of accounts or as political
assassinations as wartime resistance groups vied for post-war positioning). Quite apart
from executions as post-war justice, post-war France saw various tribunals or juries set up
to judge the conduct of persons in different professions or sectors of society, and to decide
whether they should lose their jobs and/or various privileges of citizenship. Even as these
proceedings had certain merits as non-criminal law mechanisms, they were not noted for
their procedural protection for the persons accused of having assaulted French national
dignity, thereby dishonouring themselves.40
We should also ask whether truth-only commissions have possibly done a better job at
the truth-revealing function when not fettered by a simultaneous reconciliation function.

39 Cable 10 Colombo 32, “Sri Lanka War-Crimes Accountability: The Tamil Perspective”, January 15,
2011, at http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2010/01/10COLOMBO32.html.
40 For a masterful and comprehensive treatment of the “dishonour”, status-stripping processes,
contextualized within the broader judicial trials of collaborators, see Anne Simonin, Déshonneur dans la
République: une histoire de la indignité, 1791-1958 (Paris: Grasset, 2008).
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Could it be that the luxury of the single function allows for more expansive and highquality conclusions about the truth? This is my instinct. Without being able here to
elaborate, let me just say that a simultaneous reconciliation function can capture or coopt
the truth function, because it produces pressures to instrumentalize (by downplaying
or generalization or even omission) in order to enhance the chances of the right kind of
reconciliatory social dynamic emerging. Admittedly—and this is a crucial caveat—the
institutional separation of functions in the Tutu/Brahimi proposal (into an international
truth component and a national reconciliation component) diminishes this likelihood,
but it does not eliminate it if there is intended to be interaction between the international
truth process and the national reconciliation process.
Beyond these problems of reconciliation colouring how truth is approached, there is the
more straightforward issue of sequencing. Surely, for a variety of reasons, the most stable
(not to mention most just) form of reconciliation is one based on the fullest possible
knowledge of relevant truth/s. Without getting into details of the Spanish example, this is
how many would view what has (not) happened in Spain. Spain not only set aside justice
from the start of its transition, as already noted in discussing the tensions between Spain’s
extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction and amnesties, but it then created a constrained
process of negotiating what became known as La Transición, that kept many things off
the table in the interests of a peaceful transition. This negotiation process then generated
its own narratives about reconciliation; the fact of having negotiated a constitution
without a coup, or worse a descent into civil conflict, was treated not just as a pragmatic
victory—one for which it might well have been worth sacrificing both justice and truth—
but also as itself identical with Reconciliación. Making it out of the Transición was itself
a victory and this victory generated a kind of story of elite-level acceptance of the rules of
a new party-political game within a liberal democratic constitution qua political justice
qua reconciliation. Yet, many—admittedly primarily those of the left and centre-left of
the Spanish social and political spectrum—feel there is a serious lack in the soul of Spain,
a historical amnesia to go along with the historical amnesties. As Spain enters the second
decade of the second millennium, there seems little appetite, interest or will for capital“J”
Justicia with time itself having made that largely redundant even with respect to the
Franco years (ending with his death in 1975). But, very much alive seems to be a sense
amongst a critical mass of Spaniards that La Verdad in the form of a national Memoría
Histórica very much needs to be part of Spain’s post-Franco journey in order that a
fuller Reconciliación can be possible, a knowledge-based reconciliation not one based on
seething sub-texts.41
41 Of the explosion of literature in the past decade or so in Spain on this topic, I have found especially
useful Pablo Oñate Rubalcaba, Consenso e ideología en la transición española (Madrid: Centro de
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1998) as well as Paloma Aguilar, “Memoria Histórica”, pp 768774, and “Reconciliación”, pp 1024-1031, and Juan Francisco Fuentes, “Transición”, pp 1173-1183, in
Javier Fernández Sebastián and Juan Francisco Fuentes (eds), Diccionario político y social del siglo XX
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But what about Justice plus Truth, you might ask? Unfortunately, the same may apply to
formal justice-seeking especially regarding justice-seeking in the sense of criminal justice,
which arguably tends to take all the air out of the room. Done too early, justice processes
can easily be victor’s justice and degenerate into procedurally corrupted justice. This is
all the more so if early-stage justice processes are carried out by institutions with little
social trust, such as, for example, the court system as it stands at present in Sri Lanka and
in Honduras, both. Each conviction of a person associated with the losers in a conflict
or social struggle and each acquittal or light sentence for a person associated with the
prevailing power structures will foster cynicism. Truth will both be and be perceived
widely as distorted and reconciliation will be thin or fragile.
As for internationalized trials at an early stage, they too have drawbacks. They can drag on
forever; they give the misimpression that a wider structural justice is being dealt with (e.g.
the situation with respect to the rule of law in a country) when at best individual justice
is being dealt with; they can juridify and, to that extent, fetter truth telling and a sense
of the historical record that will reach the average person; they can sensationalize; and
their very prospect arguably deepens the inside/outside laager mentality in the country
subject of the trials. One has only to read two extremely well-researched books on the
efforts to try Germans after the Second World War to realize just how little may have
been accomplished in terms of these trials playing a serious role in educating Germans
(truth) about the nature of German society’s role in the functioning of the Nazi system.42
That Germany has emerged coming to terms with its society’s responsibility for the events
of the Nazi era far more reflectively than, for example, societies like Austria and Japan
have come to grips with their conduct is probably due much less to criminal trials than is
widely assumed.43
español (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2008).
42 Ingo Müller, Hitler’s Justice: Courts of the Third Reich (IB Tauris, 1991; trans. Deborah Schineider);
Valerie Hébert, Hitler’s Generals on Trial: The Last War Crimes Trial at Nuremberg (University of Kansas
Press, 2010).
43 This footnote contains placeholder thoughts of an extremely provisional sort. A major factor in the
resistance from within Germany to criminal-trial-based accounting was the rapid advent of the Cold
War, and the knowledge of former officials in the Nazi regime and the average prideful German that
Germany was both seen and needed as a bulwark against the Soviet Communist threat. It was not good
geopolitics to put former Nazi-era officials on trial and alienate the average German by associating them
with the evils of the Nazi era (in the sense that trials of Germans “just doing their job”, the judges and
the Wehrmacht generals and so on, rubbed off on the average citizen’s sense of whether they too bore
some responsibility). Indeed, it was ‘good’ realpolitik to create as much continuity as possible with the
former regime so as to retain expertise—in the judiciary, in the intelligence services, and so on—and so as
to produce the feeling of partnership with the West in the struggle against a common enemy. It requires
much more reflection and empirically based argument than I can present here, but both Honduras and
Sri Lanka—especially the latter—‘enjoy’ geopolitical positioning that could very much produce goingthrough-the-motions internationalized criminal justice processes analogous in some respects to how the
Americans and British fairly easily acquiesced in not pursuing trials in Germany with great vigour—if
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In light of these considerations, and now speaking only of Sri Lanka, it seems to me that
the priority goal should be to assist, prod and pressure (in equal measure) Sri Lanka to
get on the road to a state of affairs in which there is well-founded trust that the domestic
rule of law is capable of and will end impunity on a forward-looking basis. If and when
one gets to that state of affairs, the politics within Sri Lanka, including the politics of
engagement with the UN, other states, and external NGOs as well as diasporic critics,
may (and hopefully will) result over time in revisiting of the alleged war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed by both the government and the LTTE—and indeed may
also pave the way to a revisiting of various 'peace time' crimes like torture, extrajudicial
execution, and disappearances. Here, the reference to “over time” is central: criminal law
justice or truth-seeking refracted through criminal law justice arguably should not be the
priority in the Sri Lankan context for the immediate future—on condition that serious
processes of truth-seeking, including internationalized and transnationalized ones, are
able to go forward.
This all seems rather defeatist, I realize many of you may be thinking. Indeed, I
acknowledge that I am to some extent in a thinking-out-loud mode here and not fully
persuaded by my own line of thinking. But, sticking with this line of argument for the
time being, I believe we should be open to seeing a realist approach to reconciliation
and, especially, criminal justice, as not necessarily a capitulation to all that is brutal and
craven and indeed evil in this very flawed world. In contrast, we might want to reflect,
philosophically as it were, on the sense in which truth can be its own form of justice and
not to be treated as something of value only in its instrumental relationship to criminal

those geopolitical realities ever even allowed such processes to be created in the first place in relation
to Sri Lanka and Honduras. Much is rightly made of Sri Lanka’s very clear geopolitical leverage that
allows them to receive unrelenting Chinese support if they want it—see the new deepwater port built in
President Rajapaksa’s district with the capacity to service Chinese naval vessels and the surge of Chinese
infrastructure-creation muscle that is being brought to bear on economic ‘development’ in ‘reconstruction’
in the North of Sri Lanka—and to also play India off against unwanted Chinese influence. Wherever
China and India fit in Sri Lanka’s gamesmanship, it takes little imagination to see how Sri Lanka can
appeal to the West’s (notably the United States’) desire not to ‘lose’ Sri Lanka to the rising Asian giants.
As for Honduras, its poverty and below-the-global-radar-screen status can easily lull the casual observer
into thinking it is of no geopolitical consequence. However, it actually sits in a strategic location with
respect to the US’ regional military reach, providing along with Panama a linking point into South
America and the Caribbean. The Palmerola air force basis in Honduras is a huge overseas asset of the
US, and Honduran elites know this gives them clout when it comes to seeking and receiving support of
the system as it stands. And strategic thinkers will not quickly forget how Honduras was key in terms of
how the US organized efforts to crush both the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador and the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua after they had come to power. The US strategic goal of not seeing portions of Latin America go
left-revolutionary and even left-populist also makes Honduras an important country in a domino-theory
worldview.
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justice or reconciliation.44 Beyond the free-standing value of truth as a form of justice,
if truth may need to be clearly established and wider populations somehow persuaded,
over time, that the truth processes were legitimate and the truth told substantially
correctly, then there may arise a more solid foundation for reconciliation (which process
will necessarily need to work out where criminal and compensatory justice fit into the
picture).
How might all this relate to the role of the Secretary General’s Sri Lanka Panel, whose job
is essentially to advise him and the UN on what to do in the future?
I would suggest that the Panel first recommend the creation of an international
commission with a rigorous investigative and truth-determining mandate but not a
mandate extending to a prosecution function. I would suggest a second part of such
an international commission’s mandate should be a report—that is, to be clear, by the
commission that I think the Panel should recommend to be created, not by the present
Panel—on what should follow its own investigation and truth-determining process,
in terms of the reconciliation and justice themes and in terms of the kinds of changes
needed to the rule of law situation in Sri Lanka for there to be any connecting up
between both political and justice institutions in Sri Lanka and the results of the body’s
truth-seeking investigations.
This second future-oriented function of the international commission will need
to address seriously whether there is a real prospect of resuscitating the rule of law
without some kind of ongoing international role including possible hybrid national/
international bodies. The commission will need to reflect on models such as the CICIG
(Guatemala) example and other examples of hybrid international/national processes
that may have worked better than CICIG. That said, the commission should not be
solely focused on criminal justice as necessarily the next stage. A CICIG-like body or
newly-designed hybrid body may well be what is needed to extend the investigation and
truth-determining mandate of the international commission beyond the warfare and
immediate-post-war context into the more general and contemporary peacetime situation
of Sri Lanka—on the basis of an assessment that eventual legal accountability for war
crimes and crimes against humanity is a chimera without the infrastructure and culture of
the rule of law.
There can be little doubt that such a recommendation from the current UN Panel (for
such an international commission to be created with the double mandate I suggest) will

44 I recognize there may be something quite Catholic in this line of argument. See, for instance, Catholic
Canon Code 2469: “The virtue of truth gives another his just due.” Being neither Catholic nor even a
believer, turning to Catholic thinking will be, for me, something other than a theological turn.

The transnationalization of truth: A meditation on Sri Lanka and Honduras

95

be resisted vigorously by Sri Lanka, perhaps for some time. Even if or when Sri Lanka
reacts more positively to such an international commission, one would naturally expect
a protracted period of debate and discussion would occur, oriented toward getting the
government and indeed Sri Lanka as a society to the point that it will enter into an
agreement with the UN for cooperation with the international investigation and truthdetermining commission.
I wish to end these “meditations” by doing a distant colleague the honour of something
he did not expect or ask for, but that I asked his permission to be able to do. That
colleague is Basil Fernando, Executive Director of the Hong Kong-based Asian Human
Rights Commission and one of the most insightful observers of the Sri Lankan context.
His work provided the central conceptual pillars for the Sri Lanka Campaign report
mentioned earlier, “The Breakdown of the Rule of Law in Sri Lanka: An Overview.”
Fernando is himself a Sri Lankan of Sinhalese background, who has lived effectively in
exile from Sri Lanka for the past couple of decades.
I wish to quote (with his permission) from some recent ideas that Fernando has put
forward on the notion, introduced above, of ‘truth as its own form of justice’ and
how this relates to the quandary of how to sequence truth-seeking in relation to both
reconciliation and accountability processes. His ideas emerged after several days' email
exchange in October 2010, towards the end of which I had come to articulate the
outlines of what I have set out above. Here is what he wrote several days ago. I could not
have put it better myself, which is why I have decided to end this lecture with his words
and not mine:
I tend to agree with this approach. It covers many areas which have worried me for a long
time, about Sri Lanka and Cambodia. There is a lot to think about.
There have been many missed opportunities due to trying to hurryingly initiate criminal
justice processes, relating to situations where violence of great magnitude has taken place,
often ignoring the political processes that arise as a result of such situations. By separating
the need to find and articulate truth and bring culprits to justice, opportunities can be
found to deal with both, but not necessarily at the same time. Ferocious political reactions
arising out of fear of criminal actions, can give rise to political processes that further
suppress the victims and silence many who want to, and in fact feel the need to, speak out
the truth.
If opportunities are created for establishing truth, without immediate linkage to
establishing evidence valid for legal purposes, great moments of creativity can be evolved,
which in turn may change the political dynamics in the particular country or at least create
a more conducive social climate, where more initiatives for reconciliation is possible.
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May I illustrate this with one example? Between 1987-1991, there was a period of intense
violence in Sri Lanka, particularly in the South. In 1994 there was a change of the
government, particularly due to popular reaction against large scale forced disappearances
which took place at the time. The government appointed several fact finding commissions.
It established around 30,000 disappearances, done by police and military. Several
international groups demanded immediate prosecution. Hardly anyone was prosecuted
and the whole affair was gradually hushed up. The whole society had no occasion to get
involved in stating what it knew about what happened and reflect on the political, social
and legal consequences of these events.
If such a process had happened, in all probability, the society and the international
community would have gained a better insight into what was happening and the
subsequent developments may have taken a different turn. Instead, new political initiatives
found favour with the military, and the ferocity of the violence shifted to North and East.
The international community quietly forgot about what happened between 1987-1991,
and attention shifted to the "New Conflict". The Truth of what took place to cause such
massive disappearances is now no one’s concern. If the international community had a
broader outlook than merely demanding prosecutions, it would have responded differently.
Between correct sounding slogans and the actual potential in a given historical situation,
there often is vast gap. As human rights groups we need to broaden our approach to meet
with such situations. 45

With these challenging words, I conclude this Transnational Justice Lecture on the
transnationalization of truth.
Thank you for attending and thank you for listening.

45 Basil Fernando, email correspondence, October 2010.

